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Bass: Dangerous Liaisons: Paramour No More

Notes
DANGEROUS LIAISONS: PARAMOUR NO
MORE
I. INTRODUCTION
Romantic office relationships are far more prevalent than some
might realize.1 Out of 1000 professionals surveyed on the subject, 47% of
workers admit that they have been involved in an office romance, while
an additional 19% admitted that they would be willing to do so if the
opportunity arose.2 Eleven percent of respondents answered that they
have dated their boss or another superior, while 31% answered that they
have never dated their boss or another superior, but would be willing to
do so.3 Only 13% of respondents reported that their company has an
office romance policy, while 51% said their company does not have an
office romance policy.4
With so many people engaging in consensual workplace romances, it
may be surprising that the number of sex discrimination claims filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has
increased dramatically since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
From 1991 to 1992, the percentage of sexual harassment claims filed with
the EEOC increased by 62% (due largely to the Anita-Hill and Clarence

1
Vault’s Office Romance Survey 2003, http://www.vault.com/nr/main_article_detail.
jsp?article_id=16513021&ht_type=5 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). Vault’s 2003 Office Romance
Survey is based on responses from over 1,000 professionals at companies nationwide. Id.
2
Id. When asked under which circumstances an office romance is unacceptable, only
21% of respondents answered that a relationship between a manager and a subordinate is
inappropriate. Id.
3
Id. Out of the people who have dated their boss or superior, 57% entered the
relationship in a mutual manner, while 31% said that their boss or superior initiated the
relationship. Id.
4
Id. Thirty-six percent of respondents do not know whether an office romance policy
exists within their workplace. Id. A long term relationship was established by 19% of
respondents as a result of their office romance, whereas 3% answered that one or both of
them were terminated as a result of their workplace relationship, and 1% answered that
they were merely reprimanded by management. Id. Fifty-five percent of respondents
answered that they experienced no repercussions resulting from their office romance. Id.
5
Giovanna Weller & Nick Zaino, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: How Did Sex Get Into the Act?, http://www.carmodylaw.com/CM/Articles/
Articles70.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). Recent EEOC statistics indicate that sex
discrimination claims account for 30.1% of charges filed in violation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Id.
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Thomas hearings),6 and such claims increased by an additional 62%
between 1992 and 2003.7
Recently, the California Supreme Court handed down an
unprecedented sex discrimination decision, Miller v. Department of
Corrections,8 which seems poised to create many problems for employers
within California and throughout the United States.9 This case has
broadened the scope of sexual harassment claims above and beyond
what any court has previously held when confronted with a consensual
inter-office relationship hostile work environment claim between a
supervisor and employee.10 According to the court, even though a
romantic relationship between a supervisor and his or her paramour11 is
consensual, other employees who believe that the paramour received
special treatment in a severe and pervasive manner may sue under a
hostile work environment sex discrimination claim.12 The Miller holding
marks the first time both men and women can be deemed injured by
sexual favoritism.13 Consequently, this holding has become a persuasive
precedent for other states to follow, thus paving the way for lawsuits
from employees to challenge any decision of a supervisor who is
involved in, or allegedly involved in, a workplace romance.14
Part II.A of this Note presents a brief history of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).15 Part II.B provides an overview of sex
discrimination under Title VII, specifically laying out the differences
between quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment
sexual harassment claims.16 Next, Part II.C explains the traditional
standards of liability for employers in sexual harassment cases.17 Part
II.D discusses the EEOC’s Policy Guidance on employer liability for
sexual favoritism under Title VII, which may be used by courts as
guidance in making decisions under Title VII law.18 Part II.E follows,

See infra note 27.
Weller & Zaino, supra note 5.
8
Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
9
See infra Part III.
10
See infra Part III.A.
11
A “paramour” is defined as “an illicit lover.”
DICTIONARY 899 (11th ed. 2004).
12
See infra Part II.F.
13
See infra Part II.F.
14
See infra Part III.B.
15
See infra Part II.A.
16
See infra Part II.B.
17
See infra Part II.C.
18
See infra Part II.D.
6
7

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/5

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE

Bass: Dangerous Liaisons: Paramour No More

2006]

Paramour No More

305

explaining the history of sexual favoritism in the workplace, referred to
as the “paramour” theory, and the types of scenarios in which such
claims arise.19 Finally, Part II.F introduces the decision in Miller. 20
Part III begins with a discussion of the expansion in the breadth of
sexual harassment law created by Miller and how the current EEOC
guidelines are insufficient to handle widespread sexual favoritism
claims.21 Part III.B addresses the implications that the Miller holding
may have on employers, employees, and the workplace as a whole.22
Part III.C concludes the Analysis portion by discussing various
preventative measures employers can take to protect themselves from
new risks they face as a result of the Miller holding.23
Part IV proposes amendments to the EEOC Policy Guidance on
Sexual Favoritism to better accommodate claims based on sexual
favoritism.24 These changes clarify the current guidance and better assist
the courts, employers, and employees in determining which factors point
to widespread instances rather than isolated instances of sexual
favoritism.25 Finally, Part V reiterates that the scope of sexual harassment
jurisprudence has been greatly expanded as a result of Miller and that
immediate action must be taken by the EEOC to protect employers and
control sexual harassment claims made by third parties who were not
directly subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence
Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem that continues to plague
American workplaces in the twenty-first century.27 Title VII establishes a
See infra Part II.E.
See infra Part II.F.
21
See infra Part III.A.
22
See infra Part III.B.
23
See infra Part III.C.
24
See infra Part IV.
25
See infra Part IV.
26
See infra Part V.
27
Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors, EEOC Notice 915.002, (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance].
Sexual harassment litigation has expanded at an extraordinary rate. Id. The number of
harassment charges filed with the EEOC and state fair employment practices agencies has
risen significantly in recent years. Id. For example, the number of sexual harassment
charges increased from 6,883 in 1991 to 15,618 in 1998. Id. One factor offered as
explanation for this boom in sexual harassment lawsuits is the 1991 nationally televised
19
20
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private cause of action for sexual harassment in the workplace.28 The
primary goal of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment based on differences in race, color, religion,
national origin, and sex.29 Thus, Title VII’s purpose in the realm of sex
Clarence Thomas Supreme Court Senate confirmation hearings that introduced the law of
sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as the wide variety of workplace conduct that
can constitute an actionable harassment claim, to millions of Americans. 62 AM. JUR. Trials
235 § 1 (2005). In 1989, the Supreme Court issued several decisions that were seen as a
threat to other civil rights protections. Weller & Zaino, supra note 5. See also Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (making it more difficult to establish
discrimination by disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(allowing the employer to avoid liability in a mixed motive case by showing that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not allowed a discriminatory reason to play a
role); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that workplace
harassment and discrimination on the job were not actionable under Section 1981); Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that white men who were not parties in litigation that
resulted in a court-approved affirmative action could challenge the plan); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (limitations period runs from the date of the allegedly
discriminatory adoption of a seniority system plan); Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (finding that attorneys’ fees can be recovered under Title VII
against losing interveners only if the intervener’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation). Congress recognized what was happening and passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1990. Weller & Zaino, supra note 5. President Bush vetoed the bill, labeling it
an unacceptable “quota” bill, so Congress raised a modified version of the bill early the
next session. Id. The modified bill also seemed “destined to fail” because President Bush
had a 91% approval rating due to the Persian Gulf War. Id. However, “key events
intervened to influence the law” and as the 1991 bill was pending in Congress, President
Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court in July 1991. Id. During Justice
Thomas’s confirmation hearings, a former colleague, Anita Hill, alleged that Thomas
sexually harassed her when he was the Chairman of the EEOC. Id. Inevitably, “[t]hese
allegations caused a media frenzy resulting in nationally televised confirmation hearings
that were viewed by millions of Americans.” Id. After three days of hearings, Thomas’s
nomination was confirmed. Id. Another factor occurring during this period was the
widespread riots erupting in Los Angeles in protest to the police beating of Rodney King.
Id. That issue again put civil rights in the forefront of the minds of Congress and the
American people. Id. As a result, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with
enough votes to override a presidential veto. Id. President Bush signed virtually the same
bill that just one year before he vetoed as a “quota” bill. Id. The 1991 amendments
overruled many prior Supreme Court decisions restricting civil rights, “[giving] employees
the right to have a jury trial, and expand[ing] the remedies available to prevailing plaintiffs
to include compensatory and punitive damages.” Id.
28
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). Title VII
was enacted in 1964 and took effect in July of 1965. It was expanded by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which creates compensatory and punitive damage remedies for claims of
intentional discrimination. The 1991 Act was signed into law on November 21, 1991, and
the expanded remedies apply to all conduct occurring after that date. Title VII is the
principle statutory medium by which sexual harassment suits are prosecuted and the basis
from which state legislation is typically drafted.
29
Id. The relevant portions of Title VII provide:
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discrimination is to eliminate disparate treatment of men and women
based on gender.30
On February 8, 1964, while the civil rights bill was being debated on
the House floor, Howard W. Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the Rules
Committee and staunch opponent of all civil rights legislation, stood up
and offered a one word amendment, “sex”, to Title VII.31 Smith claimed
that “sex” should be added to the bill in order “to prevent discrimination
against another minority group, the women,” when in reality, “sex” was
offered as a desperate attempt to kill the entire bill.32 However, the

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his [her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual’s . . . sex . . . ; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
[her or] his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her or] his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex.
Id. The phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” exudes a congressional
intent “‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in
employment,” thus the language of the Act “is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’
discrimination.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978))) (some internal quotations omitted). The Act’s language
includes allowing people to work in a non-discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.
Id. Title VII applies to employees, job applicants, and former employees. See Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
30
See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
31
Jo Freeman, Ph.D., How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of
Public Policy, http://www.jofreeman.com/lawandpolicy/titlevii.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2005) (referencing 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964)).
32
Id. Congressman Smith maintained at the time that he was very serious about the bill.
Id. Such a preposterous notion inspired several hours of humorous debate to which the
primary argument against the additional prohibition against discrimination based on sex to
Title VII was that sex discrimination was sufficiently different from other types of
discrimination and that it ought to receive completely separate legislative treatment. Id.
The White House, a few women’s rights groups, and others that supported the Civil Rights
bill were opposed to the amendment because they feared it would defeat the entire bill.
Weller & Zaino, supra note 5. Every man that had voted in favor of the amendment, with
the exception of Representative Ross Bass, had voted against the bill. Id. For further
commentary that the word “sex” was added to Title VII to undercut the bill, see Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60
F.R.D. 432, 434-35 (W.D. Pa. 1973); David M. Neff, Note, Denial of Title VII Protection to
Transsexuals: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 553 (1985); Comment,
Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1167 (1971).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5

308

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

amended bill was passed by a 168 to 133 teller vote,33 and the debate
over the word “sex” was later enshrined as “ladies day in the House.”34
As a result of such a hurried addition to the amendment, the Supreme
Court noted that “we are left with little legislative history to guide us in
interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on
‘sex.’”35
B. Elements Common to all Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII
The EEOC has defined sexual harassment to include unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature when submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s
employment.36 If the submission to or rejection of such conduct has the
33
During a teller vote, members vote by turning in signed index cards: green for yea and
red for nay. C-Span, Congressional Glossary, http://www.c-span.org/guide/congress/
glossary/tellervt.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
34
Freeman, supra note 31. Congressman Smith’s strategy to defeat the bill backfired and
was sent to the Senate. Weller & Zaino, supra note 5. Representative Martha Griffiths, one
of the few women in Congress at the time, is often credited with convincing the
predominantly male House to pass the amendment. Id. After 58 days of filibuster by
Southern Senators, the longest filibuster in Congressional history, the bill was passed and
signed into law by President Johnson on July 2, 1964, prohibiting employment
discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion and sex. Id.
35
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
36
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2005).
The EEOC oversees Title VII and processes
discrimination complaints. Elizabeth Jubin Fujiwara & Joyce M. Brown, Causes of Action for
Post-Ellerth/Faragher Title VII Employment Sexual Harassment Claims, in 27 CAUSES OF
ACTION 2d 1, § 27 (2005). Prior to Title VII’s enactment, there was very little recourse
available to women who suffered from sexual harassment in the workplace. Id. Women in
such a circumstance could either threaten legal action or actually bring a lawsuit based on
common-law torts, such as assault and battery. Id. “This finally changed with the
guidelines pronounced by the EEOC originally in 1980 in which the EEOC defines illegal
sexual harassment to include: (1) unwelcome sexual advances, (2) requests for sexual
favors, and (3) ‘other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.’” Id. Specifically the
EEOC’s Sexual Harassment guidelines provide:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual
harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole
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purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work
performance, an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment
may be created.37 Typically, a prima facie case for supervisor sexual
harassment can fall under one of two theories: quid pro quo or hostile
work environment.38 Under both theories, an employee must prove that
(1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harassment, and (2) the
harassment complained of was based on sex. 39

and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action
will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(b).
37
Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.
38
Id. A prima facie case in an employee’s action alleging sexual harassment under Title
VII by a supervisor or superior requires proof that: (1) an unlawful harassment has
occurred; (2) the harasser has supervisory status; and (3) the discrimination was based on
sex. Id.
39
Id. An employer is liable for a hostile work environment, even if no tangible
employment action was taken, if the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive and the
employer failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior and
the employee reasonably tried to inform the employer to correct the harassment. Id. It is
important to note that sexual harassment will be deemed “unwelcome” even if the person
eventually submits to the request. Id. The Supreme Court has held that courts must ask
whether the “respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. See also Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 617 (2001) (finding where a long term sexual relationship goes
sour, no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was anything other than a willing
participant, and thus it will be the unusual case that can escape summary judgment);
O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735 (1st Cir. 2001) (joining the Sixth Circuit
and holding, contrary to the Tenth Circuit, that the determination whether a female
firefighter was subjected to hostile work environment was not required to be made in the
context of blue collar environment in which crude language was commonly used, since a
woman who chooses to work in a male-dominated trade does not thereby relinquish her
right to be free from sexual harassment); Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721,
736-37 (8th Cir. 2000) (supervisors alleged use of offensive language was not unwelcome
where employee’s testimony indicated that she used offensive language herself around
supervisor and other employees); Scusa v. Nestle USA Co., Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir.
1999) (female factory employee failed to demonstrate that behavior of her co-workers was
unwelcome where undisputed evidence showed that the employee engaged in behavior
similar to that which she claimed was unwelcome and offensive, including the use of
profanity, telling off-color jokes at work, and teasing other employees). In addition, courts
look to the totality of circumstances to make determinations as to whether the harassment
complained of was based on sex. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. The Supreme Court in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) emphasized that harassment in the
workplace is not automatically discrimination because of sex “merely because the words
used had sexual content or connotations.” See also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d
1080, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1656 (2001) (while sexually explicit
language and sex stereotyping may constitute evidence of sex discrimination, such does
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Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

The term sexual harassment may lead many people to think of the
first type of sexual harassment, premised on “quid pro quo” (literally
“something for something”), where the employer conditions some type
of economic benefit on an employee engaging in sexual acts.40 In order
to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, a
plaintiff must present evidence that he or she was subjected to
unwelcome conduct, based on sex, and that the reaction to that conduct
was then used as the basis for decisions, either actual or threatened,
affecting compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.41

not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision and
sexually explicit insults that arise solely from altercations over work-related issues and
because of employee’s apparent homosexuality do not violate Title VII). In addition,
discrimination based on personal animosity is not actionable. See Succar v. Dade County
Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (male school teacher failed to establish that
harassment by another teacher with whom he had had a consensual sexual relationship
was based on sex, where evidence suggested teacher’s harassment was motivated not by
his male gender, but rather by his contempt for the alleged harasser following their failed
relationship; personal animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination and an
employee cannot turn a personal feud with another employee into a sex discrimination
case).
40
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The plaintiff in Meritor feared that she would lose her job if she
failed to give in to her employer’s sexual demands. Id. at 60. This claim could have fallen
into the category of quid pro quo since she would be losing an economic benefit; however,
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that a quid pro quo claim was not necessary for
the plaintiff to recover under a sexual harassment theory. Id. at 65. The Court found that
sexual harassment can also occur when the sexual harassment creates a hostile work
environment. Id. The Court relied on holdings from lower courts and the EEOC
Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in reaching its decision. Id. at 65-68.
41
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000). To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
harassment under Title VII, the employee must show that: (1) the employee belongs to a
protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the employee’s reaction to the harassment
affected tangible aspects of employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment; and (5) that the employer knew, or should have known of the harassment
and took no effective remedial action. Id. See also Velez Cortes v. Nieves Valle, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 206 (D.P.R. 2003). In Velez Cortes, a female employee established that she was
subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment by the company president where she was
employed because she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, statements with overt
sexual overtones, and inquiries into her personal life. Id. at 212-13. The company was
aware of the president’s actions, but took no steps to stop it and the employee suffered the
tangible job detriment of being terminated without ever having been reprimanded
previously. Id. at 214-15.
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Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

As a supplement to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, a
broader hostile work environment claim for sexual harassment
developed, culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson.42 The core of the Meritor holding is that a plaintiff
may establish a Title VII violation by proving that sex discrimination
resulting from sexual harassment creates a hostile or abusive work
environment.43 Thus, in order for a hostile work environment claim to
be actionable, the sexual harassment in question “must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment
and create an abusive working environment.’”44

42
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57. A number of issues relating to Title VII sexual harassment
were decided by the Meritor court, ruling that: (1) sexual harassment is indeed sex
discrimination, and is prohibited by Title VII; (2) sexual harassment that creates a hostile
and abusive environment may violate Title VII, even in the absence of tangible adverse
economic consequences for the employee; and (3) an employee’s “voluntary” submission to
an employer’s sexual advances will not necessarily defeat a harassment claim, the true
issue being whether the advances were “unwelcome.” Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.
However, the Meritor court left open the question of employer liability. Id. The Court
acknowledged the possible injustices which can be created for either the employer or the
employee by hard and fast rules. Id. However, it was left up to the appellate courts to
devise a liability test for employers using agency principles. Id. Over the years, two tests
emerged from the appellate courts: (1) a proven quid pro quo sexual harassment claim
resulting in an employer’s vicarious liability; and (2) a proven hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim resulting in employer’s liability only if the employer was further
proven negligent. Id. Since the Meritor decision, courts nationwide have recognized the
distinctions drawn between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual
harassment. Id. In 1998, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to two cases, Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998), to establish more defined parameters for the courts to apply when employer liability
issues arose in sexual harassment complaints. Id. The Court held that an employer is
vicariously liable for unlawful sexual harassment by a supervisor that culminates in a
tangible employment action against the victim. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61. This holding
established that the Court will look closely at whether the plaintiff establishes a nexus
between the harassment and the tangible employment action. Fujiwara & Brown, supra
note 36. According to employment experts Katz and Kabat, “The result is that practitioners
should focus on the presence or absence of a tangible employment action, and not the
categories of ‘quid pro quo’ and ‘hostile work environment’ which the Burlington Court
effectively abandoned.” Debra S. Katz, et. al., Advanced Employment Law and Litigation:
Sexual Harassment In The Workplace, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 5-7, 2002 (on file with
the author).
43
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. The Court rejected the argument that a Title VII claim could
only be based on “tangible, economic barriers erected by discrimination.” Id. at 64.
44
Id. at 67. Although the Court found that the allegations in Meritor supported a hostile
environment claim, the Court did not define what types of specific conduct would qualify
as “sufficiently pervasive” to support a hostile environment claim. Id. at 72.
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Additionally, the creation of a hostile work environment need not
necessarily involve unwelcome sexual advances.45
Sexual harassment creates a hostile, offensive,
oppressive, or intimidating work environment and
deprives its victim of [the employee’s] statutory right to
work in a place free of discrimination, when the sexually
harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates,
distresses or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt
[the employee’s] emotional tranquility in the workplace,
affect [the employee’s] ability to perform her job as
usual, or otherwise interferes with and undermines [the
employee’s] personal sense of well-being.46
To determine whether conduct is actionable, courts utilize the
following two-part test: (1) the harassment must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a work environment that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive; and (2) the plaintiff must actually perceive the
work environment to have been hostile or abusive.47

45
Accardi v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 295-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See also
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d. Cir. 1990); McKinney v. Dole, 765
F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985). To plead a cause of action for hostile work environment
sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the
discrimination, and that if the plaintiff ‘had been a man she would not have been treated in
the same manner.’” Accardi, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295-96 (quoting Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1977)). Generally, hostile work environment
shows itself in the form of intimidation and hostility for the purpose of interfering with an
individual’s work performance. Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 782 (1st Cir.
1990) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1983)).
46
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In
Fisher, a nurse and her husband, a physician, brought actions against the nurse’s
supervising physician, the hospital where they worked, and a third physician. Id. at 846.
The action stemmed from the supervising physician’s sexual harassment of the nurse and
other women, her complaint to the hospital against the supervising physician, and the
retaliatory actions against both the nurse and the husband by the third physician and the
hospital. Id. at 847. The appellate court held that appellants should have been permitted to
amend the complaint to allege environmental sexual harassment, that the hospital was not
liable for the doctor’s behavior, but might have been liable for the lease termination, that
there was no retaliation cause of action against the pediatrician, and that there was no
interference with business relations nor support for punitive damages. Id. at 860-61.
47
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). To establish a prima facie
case of hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII, the employee must
show that: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or
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Severe or Pervasive Conduct

According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris v. Forklift
Systems,48 both an objective and subjective standard needs to be satisfied
in order to recover under a hostile work environment sexual harassment
theory.49 The emphasis of both the language and the legislative history
of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment;50 therefore,
the proscribed differentiation under Title VII must be a distinction based
on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.51
When the workplace is permeated with “discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” Title VII is violated.52 Factors
contributing to a hostile environment may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.53 All of the circumstances within an environment need to
be evaluated to determine if it is “hostile” or “abusive.”54
The severe or pervasive element in hostile work environment cases is
often difficult to assess because there is a general inconsistency among
holdings as to what actually qualifies as sufficiently severe or pervasive
conduct.55 Generally, courts have required more than a single instance of
should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. Callahan
v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1996).
48
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
49
Id.
50
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
51
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 825 (1987). See also Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))
(the congressional intent of Title VII pertaining to terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment was to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women” in employment); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)
(quoting same).
52
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
53
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
54
Id.
55
AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 37. Not every unpleasant workplace is a sexually
hostile environment under Title VII. Id. Occasional vulgarities, including banter tinged
with sexual innuendo, is neither severe or pervasive nor offensive enough to be actionable.
Id. Under Title VII, in cases of sexual harassment, a workplace that is actionable is the one
that is “hellish.” See Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the employer was not liable for sexual harassment because it did not have
reason to know of the alleged harassment and plaintiff had options other than quitting,
thus she could not prevail on the constructive discharge claim).
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inappropriate conduct before they will find a basis for a claim under a
hostile work environment theory.56 However, there are decisions that go
even further, establishing that even multiple isolated incidents are not
enough to form a basis for a hostile work environment claim where they
fall short of a discernable pattern of actual harassment.57 Because the
requirement is that the conduct must be severe or pervasive, some courts
apply a sliding-scale approach to the analysis, such that a greater degree
of pervasiveness will make up for a lesser degree of severity and vice
versa.58 One such court observed that “the required showing of severity
or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the
pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”59 How frequently the
conduct must occur in order to state a cause of action is difficult to
discern given the vast inconsistencies in case law.60
b.

The Employer Should Have Known About the Hostile Environment

In addition to evaluating the severe or pervasive conduct, the
claimant in a hostile work environment claim must establish that the
employer knew, or should have known of the hostile work environment,
and failed to take the appropriate remedial actions necessary to rid the
work environment of the harassment.61 This may be the most significant
56
See, e.g., Raines v. City of Kimball, 916 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Kuhn v. Philip
Morris U.S.A., 814 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994); Raley v. Bd.
of St. Mary’s County Comm’rs, 752 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Md. 1990). Under these cases, there
was no basis for a sexual harassment claim because a single isolated incident could not be
used to prove sexual harassment.
57
See, e.g., Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d. 526 (7th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Tower
Air, CV-90-3085, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9372 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 1993). Under these cases, a
pattern or practice of offensive conduct is generally required to satisfy the requirement that
the conduct be severe or pervasive enough to establish a true hostile work environment
claim.
58
AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 37. The current state of the law in regards to this
element of a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment is best
summarized as requiring proof of either a long-standing pattern of harassing conduct, or, if
there are only a few isolated occurrences, a showing that the offensive conduct was
especially egregious. Id.
59
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d. 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Ross v. Double Diamond
Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich.
1986).
60
See also Chad W. King, Note, Sex, Love Letters, and Vicious Rumors: Anticipating New
Situations Creating Sexually Hostile Work Environments, 36 BYU J. PUB. L. 341 (1995)
(discussing evolving bases of employer liability under the Title VII hostile work
environment theory).
61
Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988). The term
“management” as used for determining whether an employer had actual knowledge of
sexual harassment under Title VII includes a person with the power to hire and fire the
offending employee, provide significant input into employment decisions, and take
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element from an employer’s perspective.62 The result is that an employer
bears no liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment under
this element where the employer has no reason to know of the harassing
conduct.63 Additionally, if the employer demonstrates that immediate
and appropriate action was taken in response to a reported hostile work
environment claim, the employer is generally released from liability for a
subsequent claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.64 The
employer must take prompt remedial action that is both reasonably
calculated to end the harassment and of a disciplinary nature.65
The situation becomes more delicate when the complainant’s
supervisor participated in or was the cause of the harassment.66 Initially
the argument was made that the employer knew, or should have known
of the harassing conduct because one of the employer’s supervisors was
responsible for creating the hostile work environment and thus a strict
liability standard was imposed.67 Around that same time, other courts
ruled that the employer could bear liability for a hostile work

disciplinary action and instruct the offending employee to cease the harassing behavior, or
to implement other means of taking remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000); Sharp v. City
of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999).
62
AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 39.
63
See generally Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 1994).
64
See, e.g., Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1994); Saxton v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993); Rouse v. City of Milwaukee, 921 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.
Wis. 1996); Walsh v. Nat’l Westminster Bancorp, 921 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Bivens v.
Jeffers Vet Supply, 873 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
65
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). An employer must satisfy two elements
in order to successfully raise an affirmative defense to Title VII liability for sexual
harassment by a supervisor: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and (2) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000; Madray v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000). The
standard is the same in the case of non-employees, but the employer’s control over such
individuals’ misconduct is considered. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27.
66
AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 39.
67
See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. App. 1981). In Bundy, the plaintiff was
repeatedly subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, which she rejected. Id. at 940. The
plaintiff complained about the conduct to her supervisor and he replied that “any man in
his right mind would want to rape you” and he “casually dismissed” all of her complaints.
Id. The District Court of Columbia Circuit recognized a claim for sex discrimination based
on emotional and psychological factors in the work environment, which took sexual
harassment jurisprudence beyond the loss of tangible job benefits realm. Id. at 943-44.
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environment created by supervisors only if the employer knew of the
harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.68
Today, courts generally agree that employers are not to be held
strictly liable in cases arising from hostile work environment sexual
harassment, even if supervisory personnel contributed to the
environment.69 Some courts apply agency principles as a method of
creating a standard,70 while others find that the analysis depends upon
general negligence principles based on whether the employer knew, or
should have known, of the supervisor’s proclivity for harassment.71
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 915 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henson, an employee claimed
that the police chief created a hostile and offensive working environment for women, that
her resignation was a constructive discharge, and that the police chief prevented her from
attending the police academy because she refused to have sexual relations with him. Id. at
899-900. The court affirmed the dismissal of employee’s constructive discharge claim
because the finding that she did not resign because of sexual harassment was not clearly
erroneous. Id. at 907. The court reversed and remanded her hostile work environment
claim because she did not have to show a tangible job detriment and her quid pro quo
claim was reversed and remanded because the district court erroneously found a lack of
corroborative evidence. Id. at 907, 911-13.
69
See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
70
The Supreme Court has instructed courts to use agency principles when deciding
employer liability for sexually hostile work environments. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). Meritor rejects the possibility that employers are strictly
liable for hostile environments and also repudiates the notion that a grievance procedure
will automatically protect the employer. Id. at 72-73. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66
F.3d 1295, 1324 (2d Cir. 1995) (Baker, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII permits an
employer and that employer’s agent to be held jointly and severally liable for Title VII
violations); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. App. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995))
(applying traditional common law principles of agency to the facts and holding that the
plaintiff failed to support her Title VII sex discrimination claim on either a quid pro quo or
hostile work environment basis); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994). In
Bouton, the court discussed how liability is imposed on the master when the servant
purports to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there is reliance upon apparent
authority, or he is aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id. at 108. If the harasser is an agent of the employer, the employer is liable. Id. at 109. The
court held that BMW was not liable under traditional agency principles. Id. at 111.
71
See, e.g., Rushing v. United Airlines, 919 F. Supp 1101, 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The
question of liability vel non is decided under negligence principles. Saxton v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913
F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990)):
It is a negligence standard that closely resembles the “fellow servant”
rule, from the era when industrial accidents were governed by
negligence rather than workers’ compensation law. Under that rule, as
under Title VII, the employer, provided it has used due care in hiring
the offending employee in the first place, is liable for that employee’s
torts against a coworker only if, knowing or having reason to know of
the misconduct, the employer unreasonably fails to take appropriate
68
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Other courts go so far as to combine the elements of the agency and
negligence theories.72 There is, however, no clear standard for employer
liability where supervisors are involved.73
Thus, an employer can be held vicariously liable for a hostile work
environment claim if no tangible employment action was taken, but the
harassing conduct was severe or pervasive, the employer failed to take
reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior, and the
employee reasonably tried to inform the employer to correct the
harassment.74
C. Employer Defenses
Once it has been determined that an employer should have known
about alleged harassment, the standard under which employers are
subject to vicarious liability for unlawful harassment by supervisors
must be determined.75 The Supreme Court spelled out this standard in
corrective action. The employer acts unreasonably either if it delays
unduly or if the action it does take, however promptly, is not
reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct from recurring.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
72
See, e.g., Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd of Educ., 889 F. Supp 288 (N.D. Ohio
1995). The court determined that whether or not the employer is liable for an employee’s
harassing actions depends on: (1) whether the employee’s harassing actions were
foreseeable or fell within the scope of his employment; and (2) even if they were, whether
the employer responded adequately and effectively to negate liability. Id. at 294.
73
AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 39.
74
Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.
75
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27. The EEOC defines supervisor to include both
an individual with “authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions”
and an individual who has “authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.” Id.
See also Gawley v. Ind. Univ., 276 F.3d 301, 310-11 (7th Cir. 2001) (although the harasser
was not the female police officer’s immediate or higher supervisor, it cannot be said that he
was not aided by the agency relationship in carrying out the harassment where the
harasser occasionally acted as plaintiff’s commanding officer, he had the ability to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against her, he had special access to her because of his position as
supervisor in charge of uniforms, and it was through this position that harasser had the
opportunity to fondle employee’s breast and verbally abuse her with regard to the fit of her
pants); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999) (in general,
complete authority to act on employer’s behalf without the agreement of others is not
necessary to meet Title VII’s agency standard for supervisor liability and thus even if the
unit leader did not have authority to act alone, where witnesses testified that he was part of
the ruling “triumvirate” in the office, and part of a team that decided to strip employee of
her office, the unit leader had supervisory authority for purposes of imposing liability on
the company for his conduct). But see Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 506 (7th
Cir. 2004) (holding that even though the harassers had authority to manage the employee’s
work assignments, investigate complaints and disputes, and recommend sanctions for
rules violations to department manager, they were not supervisors so as to trigger
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Burlington Industries v. Ellerth76 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.77 The
standard of liability set forth in these decisions is based on two
principles: (1) that an employer is responsible for the acts of its
supervisors; and (2) employers should be encouraged to prevent
harassment and employees should be encouraged to avoid or limit the
harm from harassment.78 According to the Court, an employer is always
liable for a supervisor’s harassment if it culminates in a tangible
employment action.79 However, if a tangible employment action does
not occur, the employer may avoid liability or limit damages by
establishing an affirmative defense that includes two necessary elements:
(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct any harassing behavior; and (2) the employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.80 The employer
vicarious liability under Title VII); Mikels v. City of Durham 183 F.3d 323, 331-34 (4th Cir.
1999) (wherein a female police officer could not establish that a male corporal’s sexually
harassing conduct was aided by the agency relation since the corporal’s authority did not
include power to take tangible employment actions against the officer; the question is
whether the person’s employment relation to the victim was such as to constitute a
continuing threat to her employment conditions that made her vulnerable to and
defenseless against the particular conduct in ways that comparable conduct by a mere coworker would not).
76
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998).
77
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 775 (1998). In Faragher, the Court
referred to a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee as its definition of who qualifies as a supervisor for liability purposes. Id. at 80708.
78
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27. While the Faragher and Ellerth decisions
addressed sexual harassment, the Court’s analysis drew upon standards set forth in cases
involving harassment on other protected bases. Moreover, the EEOC has always taken the
position that the same basic standards apply to all types of prohibited harassment. See, e.g.,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1 (2005) (“The principles involved here continue to apply to race,
color, religion or national origin.”); EEOC Compliance Manual Volume II, § 615.11(a),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.htm (“Title VII law and agency
principles will guide the determination of whether an employer is liable for age harassment
by its supervisors, employees, or non-employees.”). Thus, the standard of liability set forth
in the decisions applies to all forms of unlawful harassment. Enforcement Guidance, supra
note 27.
79
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
80
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27. “In essence, the affirmative defense requires
that sexual harassment disputes be investigated and resolved internally before proceeding
to court. A victim who refuses to assist an internal investigation loses her Title VII claim,
and an employer who fails to conduct such an investigation loses all defenses to the claim
of harassment.” Joann Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003). The affirmative
defense gives credit for such preventive efforts by an employer, thereby “implement[ing]
clear statutory policy and complement[ing] the Government’s Title VII enforcement
efforts.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
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will avoid vicarious liability for its supervisor’s acts if the employer is
successful in raising the affirmative defense.81
According to the framework set out in the Ellerth and Faragher
decisions, if the unlawful sexual harassment did not result in a tangible
employment action according to the quid pro quo framework, then the
alleged sexual harassment is reviewed to determine if the harassment
reached the severe or pervasive behavior required for a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim.82 If the alleged sexual harassment
81
Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36. It is very important to determine whether the
person who engaged in unlawful harassment had supervisory authority over the
complainant. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27. An employer is subject to vicarious
liability for unlawful harassment if the harassment was committed “by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765;
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The federal employment discrimination statutes do not define the
term supervisor. Numerous statutes contain the word supervisor, and some contain
definitions of the term. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1813(r) (2000) (definition of “State bank
supervisor” in legislation regarding Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11) (2000) (definition of “supervisor” in National Labor Relations Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 8262(2) (2000) (definition of “facility energy supervisor” in Federal Energy Initiative
legislation). The definitions vary depending on the purpose and structure of each statute.
The definition of the word supervisor under other statutes does not control, and is not
affected by the meaning of that term under the employment discrimination statutes. The
statutes make employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their agents, thus logically
supervisors are agents. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA); 42
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA) (all defining “employer” as including any agent of the
employer). The determination of whether an individual has sufficient authority to qualify
as a supervisor for purposes of vicarious liability cannot be resolved by a purely
mechanical application of agency law. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797 (analysis of vicarious
liability “calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth
in the Restatement, but rather an enquiry into the reasons that would support a conclusion
that harassing behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor’s employment”);
Id. at 803 n.3 (agency concepts must be adapted to the practical objectives of the antidiscrimination statutes). In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court reasoned that vicarious
liability for supervisor harassment is appropriate because supervisors are aided in such
misconduct by the authority that the employers delegated to them. Id. at 801; Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 762. Thus such authority must be of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment. Enforcement Guidance, supra note
27. An individual qualifies as an employee’s supervisor if: (1) the individual has authority
to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee; or (2)
the individual has authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities. Id.
82
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. Prior to Ellerth, the Court noted that there were distinctions in
employer’s liability based on whether a quid pro quo sexual harassment or hostile work
environment sexual harassment was alleged. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36. Because of
such a distinction in liability, the negative effect of encouraging a plaintiff to file a quid pro
quo sexual harassment claim emerged because such a litigation strategy would leave the
plaintiff in the preferable position of being able to prevent the employer from raising an
affirmative defense. Id. Such an action defeats the purposes of Title VII that specifically
encouraged employers to prevent discrimination. Id. The Court in Ellerth believed there
was no statutory basis for such differentiation, stating, “Cases based on threats which are
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is found to be severe or pervasive, then the employer may raise an
affirmative defense.83
Once the possibility exists that a sexual
harassment claim may be brought under Title VII, courts often turn to
EEOC guidance, which does not bind the courts but provides a useful
framework for describing Title VII sexual harassment law.84
D. EEOC Guidance
Relying on several federal court decisions that have considered
sexual favoritism, particularly favoritism shown by a supervisor to
employees who are the supervisor’s sexual partners, the EEOC issued a
policy statement that examines the question of sexual favoritism within
the Title VII sexual harassment realm.85 The 1990 policy statement, titled
Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism,
closely examines three topics: Section A discusses isolated favoritism;
Section B discusses favoritism when sexual favors have been coerced;
and Section C discusses widespread favoring of consensual sexual
partners.86 In Section A, the EEOC observed that Title VII does not

carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions
or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. Those two terms do not appear in Title VII, which
forbids only “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his . . . terms [or]
conditions . . . of employment, because of . . . sex.” Id. The Court’s opinion criticized the
use of the two types of sexual harassment categories, quid pro quo and hostile work
environment, that had developed over years to define a sexual harassment claim. 27
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1, § 27 (2005). Nevertheless, the Court used the term hostile work
environment to determine the nature of Ellerth’s sexual harassment claim, concluding that
the two terms are of limited utility. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. The distinction between cases
involving a carried-out threat and cases involving offensive conduct in general are relevant
only when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination. Id. A
claim involving only unfulfilled threats, such as the case here, is a hostile work
environment claim requiring a showing of severe or pervasive conduct. Id.
83
Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.
84
Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 547, 553 (1994). The EEOC guidelines have since been adopted by many
courts, and were clearly endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1986 in Meritor. Fujiwara &
Brown, supra note 36.
85
Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC
Notice No. 915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Policy Guidance].
86
Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 88 (Cal. 2005). Section A explains:
An isolated instance of favoritism toward a “paramour” may be unfair,
but it does not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title
VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.
A female charging party who is denied an employment benefit because
of such sexual favoritism would not have been treated more favorably
had she been a man nor, conversely, was she treated less favorably
because she was a woman.
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prohibit isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon
consensual romantic relationships.87 Section A of the policy guideance
specifies that “An isolated instance of favoritism toward a ‘paramour’ (or
a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against
women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for
reasons other than their genders.”88 Furthermore, “A female charging
party who is denied an employment benefit because of such sexual
favoritism would not have been treated more favorably had she been a
man, nor, conversely, was she treated less favorably because she was a
woman.”89 This portion of the EEOC Policy Statement reflects the
Policy Guidance, supra note 85. Section B explains the Commission’s position concerning
coerced sexual activity, which is not relevant to this analysis. Id. Section C is the portion in
which the EEOC discusses sexual favoritism that is based upon consensual affairs that are
more than isolated:
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is widespread in
a workplace, both male and female colleagues who do not welcome
this conduct can establish a hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed at
them and regardless of whether those who were granted favorable
treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. In these circumstances,
a message is implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as
“sexual playthings,” thereby creating an atmosphere that is demeaning
to women. Both men and women who find this offensive can establish
a violation if the conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter
the conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”
Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
“An analogy can be made to a situation in which supervisors in an office regularly make
racial, ethnic or sexual jokes. Even if the targets of the humor ‘play along’ and in no way
display that they object, co-workers of any race, national origin or sex can claim that this
conduct, which communicates a bias against protected class members, creates a hostile
work environment for them.” Id. Section C of the Policy Guidance continues, stating:
Managers who engage in widespread sexual favoritism may also
communicate a message that the way for women to get ahead in the
workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct or that sexual solicitations
are a prerequisite to their fair treatment. This can form the basis of an
implicit “quid pro quo” harassment claim for female employees, as
well as a hostile environment claim for both women and men who find
this offensive.
Id.
87
Policy Guidance, supra note 85.
88
Id. See Benzies v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987) (holding that the denial of a promotion to a woman is not a
violation if motivated by personal or political favoritism or a grudge); Bellissimo v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986)
(stating that the discharge of a female employee violates Title VII only if it is done on a
basis that would not result in the discharge of a male employee).
89
Policy Guidance, supra note 85. See Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495
(W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). The plaintiff in Aluminum alleged
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traditional position taken by the vast majority of federal courts that have
considered Title VII sexual favoritism claims. 90

that her supervisor treated her less favorably than her co-worker because the supervisor
knew that the co-worker was engaged in a romantic relationship with the plant manager.
Id. at 500-01. The lower court held that in order to establish a Title VII claim, the plaintiff
would have to show that her employer would have or did treat males differently. Id. at
501. Since the plaintiff’s male co-workers shared with her the same disadvantage relative
to the co-worker who was engaged in the affair with the manager, the plaintiff could not
show that she was treated differently than males. Id. See also DeCintio v. Westchester
County Med. Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
90
See Mundy v. Palmetto Ford, Inc., 998 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that for Title
VII purposes, “sex” does not include voluntary romance); Candelore v. Clark County
Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing possibility of sexual
favoritism recovery and of work environment sexual harassment claim based in part on
sexual favoritism, but denying recovery on facts); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904
F.2d 853, 861-63 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing possibility of work environment sexual
harassment recovery based in part on sexual favoritism, but denying recovery on facts);
DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-08 (holding that sexual favoritism based on consensual sexual
relationship does not constitute sex discrimination); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880-82
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (recognizing possible recovery for sexual favoritism, but reversing and
remanding trial court decision that recognized favoritism claim but denied liability on
facts); Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842 F. Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that
sexual favoritism, although not actionable as such, may help establish that advancement
generally hinged on granting sexual favors, which supports quid pro quo harassment
claim); Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825, 828-30 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying
sexual favoritism claim and holding that sexual favoritism can help establish quid pro quo
sexual harassment claim); Ayers v. AT&T, 826 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
that sexual favoritism does not constitute sex discrimination); Parrish v. English Am.
Tailoring Co., No. HAR 86-1879, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14240, at *11 (D. Md. Dec. 14, 1988)
(noting that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based upon sexual affiliations);
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting recovery for work
environment sexual harassment based almost wholly on sexual favoritism); Aluminum, 679
F. Supp. at 501-02 (holding that sexual favoritism based on consensual sexual relationship
does not constitute sex discrimination and noting that sexual favoritism may contribute to
work environment sexual harassment claim, but denying harassment claim on facts); Priest
v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding a violation of Title VII when
employer prefers female employees who submit to his sexual advances); Toscano v.
Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that proof of sexual favoritism
helps plaintiff establish that granting sexual favors is necessary for advancement, which
constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment that violates Title VII). See also Herman v.
Western Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d 696, 701-03 (Kan. 1994) (finding sexual favoritism and other
sex-related employer behavior insufficient for work environment sexual harassment
liability under Title VII); Polk v. Pollard, 539 So. 2d 675, 677-78 (La. App. 1989) (holding
that sexual favoritism does not constitute sex discrimination under state statute resembling
Title VII); Hickman v. W-S Equip. Co., 438 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (same);
Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 802-03 (N.J. 1990) (holding that at least
when the sexual relationship is consensual, resulting sexual favoritism does not violate a
state statute resembling Title VII); Nicolo v. Citibank, 554 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798-99 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (holding that isolated act of sexual favoritism favoring only one employee is not
actionable under a state statute resembling Title VII, but that sexual favoritism may
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Section C of the EEOC policy statement also entertains the possibility
that widespread sexual favoritism may create a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII.91 Both male and female colleagues
who do not welcome the widespread granting of sexual favors can
establish a hostile work environment claim in violation of Title VII
regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed at them, and
regardless of whether those who were granted favorable treatment
willingly bestowed the sexual favors.92 This portion of the policy
suggests that a demeaning message is implicitly conveyed, namely that
the managers view women as “sexual playthings” in such
circumstances.93 The EEOC guidance also states that managers who
engage in widespread sexual favoritism may also communicate a
message that the way for women to get ahead in the workplace is by
engaging in sexual conduct, or that sexual solicitations are a prerequisite
to their fair treatment.94 This can form the basis of an implicit “quid pro
quo” harassment claim for female employees, as well as a hostile
environment claim for both women and men who find such conduct
offensive.95

contribute to quid pro quo and work environment sexual harassment claims on
appropriate facts); Kersul v. Skulls Angels Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(denying motion to dismiss sexual favoritism claim under state statute resembling Title
VII); Kryeski v. Schott Glass Tech., Inc., 626 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that
sexual favoritism resulting from consensual relationship does not constitute sex
discrimination under state statute resembling Title VII), app. denied, 639 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1994).
91
Policy Guidance, supra note 85 (emphasis added).
92
Id. An analogous situation is one in which supervisors in an office regularly make
racial, ethnic or sexual jokes. Even if the targets of the humor play along with the conduct
and do not clearly object, fellow co-workers of any race, national origin or sex can claim
that this conduct, which communicates a bias against protected class members, creates a
hostile work environment for them. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (discriminatory treatment of medical patients created
hostile work environment for plaintiff employee); Commission Decision No. 71-969, CCH
EEOC Decisions (1973) (supervisor’s habitual use of racial epithet in referring to Black
employees created discriminatory work environment for White Charging Party); EEOC
Compliance Manual, supra note 78, § 615.3(a)(3) Ex. (1)-(2) (sexual harassment of females
may create hostile work environment for other male and female employees).
93
Policy Guidance, supra note 85.
94
Id. See, e.g., Rotary, 634 F. Supp. at 571, in which the defendant gave preferential
treatment to his consensual sexual partner and to those female employees who reacted
favorably to his sexual advances and other conduct of a sexual nature, and he
disadvantaged those employees, including the plaintiff, who reacted unfavorably to his
conduct. Id. at 576. The court found a violation of Title VII in part because the defendant’s
conduct implied that job benefits would be conditioned on an employee’s good-natured
endurance of his sexually-charged conduct or sexual advances. Id. at 581.
95
Policy Guidance, supra note 85. But see Aluminum, 679 F. Supp. at 501-02. The court
rejected a claim that sexual favoritism based on a consensual relationship can create a
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E. A Brief History of Sexual Favoritism and the Paramour Theory
The prohibition of sexual discrimination in the workplace has given
rise to an expansive judicial battleground;96 in fact, within the last twenty
years, recovery for sexual favoritism has become one such
battleground.97 The EEOC’s first recognition of a Title VII sexual
favoritism claim did not surface until the mid-1980s.98 Shortly thereafter,
two Title VII cases involving claims that an employer unlawfully favored
a paramour, brought under Title VII, reached the United States Court of
Appeals: King v. Palmer99 in the District of Columbia Circuit, and
DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center100 in the Second Circuit.
King v. Palmer was the first case to clearly recognize the sexual
favoritism theory as a cause of action.101 In King, the plaintiff, a female
nurse, claimed she had been denied a promotion to a supervisory
position in violation of Title VII and that the position went to a less
qualified co-worker who was engaged in an intimate relationship with
the male doctor responsible for the promotion.102 Although the issue of
whether Title VII applied to preferential treatment was not raised on
appeal, the court stated that it agreed with the lower court’s conclusion
that the cause of action was cognizable under Title VII.103

hostile environment for others in the workplace. Id. at 501. The court found that the
favoritism itself did not violate Title VII since it was voluntary, and that “hostile behavior
that does not bespeak an unlawful motive cannot support a hostile work environment
claim.” Id. at 502. However, it is the Commission’s position that had the sexual favoritism
been widespread, the fact that it was exclusively voluntary and consensual would not have
defeated a claim that it created a hostile work environment for other people in the
workplace. Policy Guidance, supra note 85.
96
Phillips, supra note 84, at 547.
97
Id.
98
Toscano v. Nimmo, 574 F. Supp 1197, 1197 (D. Del. 1983), has generally been associated
with the first Title VII sexual favoritism claim, although this case falls more along the lines
of an implied quid pro quo sexual harassment case in which sexual favoritism played a
significant role. See Joan E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry: Liability Under Title VII for Workplace
Sexual Favoritism, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 177 (1991).
99
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
100
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
101
King, 778 F.2d at 878.
102
King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65, 66 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
103
King, 778 F.2d at 880. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of its
finding that her co-worker was promoted because of the sexual relationship. Id. at 882.
There were two reasons that the District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that
this claim fell within the purview of Title VII. The first reason was that the EEOC’s
guidelines supported it. King, 598 F. Supp. at 67. The second reason was that when sexual
favoritism occurs, sex is “for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the
discrimination.” Id. at 66-67 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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A year later, King was countered by DeCintio.104 In DeCintio, seven
male respiratory therapists claimed that they were unlawfully
disqualified for a promotion that went to a woman who was engaged in
a romantic relationship with the department administrator.105 The
plaintiffs alleged that the department administrator added a requirement
to the position in order to disqualify them in an effort to enable the
administrator to hire the woman with whom he had a consensual sexual
relationship.106 The court held that the department administrator’s
conduct, although unfair, did not violate Title VII because a consensual
romantic relationship cannot form the basis of a sex discrimination
suit.107 The court reasoned that the prohibition of sex discrimination in
Title VII refers to discrimination on the basis of one’s sex, not on the
basis of one’s sexual affiliations.108 The therapists’ claims were not
cognizable under the Act, as they were denied promotions because the
administrator preferred his paramour, rather than because of their status
as males.109
The court observed that in order to recognize plaintiffs’ claims for
sex discrimination, the traditional definition of “sex” for Title VII
purposes would have to be expanded to include “sexual liaisons” or
“sexual attractions” in addition to gender.110 However, the court found
no justification for expanding the traditional definition so broadly as to
include an ongoing, voluntary, romantic engagement.111 Moreover, the
court found that distorting the meaning of the word “sex” in the context
of Title VII is both “impracticable and unwarranted.”112

DeCintio, 807 F.2d 304.
Id. at 305.
106
Id. The additional provision to be qualified for the position required the applicants to
be registered with the National Board of Respiratory Therapists. Id. The woman with
whom the administrator was romantically involved was the only person that met this
requirement. Id.
107
Id. at 308. The Second Circuit declined to adopt the King approach, “[t]o the extent
that [it] … [could] be interpreted as recognizing Title VII claims for non-gender based sex
discrimination.” Id. at 307.
108
Id.
109
Id. According to the DeCintio court, “sex” as applied to Title VII, in contrast to the
other categories afforded protection under the Act, such as race, color, religion, or
nationality, “logically could only refer to membership in a class delineated by gender,
rather than sexual activity regardless of gender.” Id. at 306. Based on this standard, the
court stated that the plaintiffs “were not prejudiced because of their status as males; rather,
they were discriminated against because [the plaintiff’s supervisor] preferred his
paramour.” Id. at 308.
110
Id. at 306.
111
Id. at 307.
112
Id. at 308.
104
105
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Additionally, the court distinguished the EEOC’s guidelines, stating
that the guidelines address the granting of employment benefits because
of an individual’s “submission” to sexual advances or requests, and that
the word “submission” connotes a lack of consent.113 Since the
department administrator did not force anyone to submit to sexual
advances in order to win a promotion, his conduct was not within the
purview of the EEOC guidelines.114 Furthermore, the court found that
the EEOC guidelines referencing sexual relationships between coworkers should not be used to evaluate personal and social
relationships.115 In holding that “voluntary, romantic relationships”
cannot form a basis for a sex discrimination suit under Title VII, the court
cited its desire to steer clear of “the policing of intimate relationships.”116
Contrary to the desire of the DeCintio court to stay away from
personal relationships, the concept of widespread favoritism was
acknowledged a year later in Broderick v. Ruder.117 In fact, in its 1990
Policy Guidance, the EEOC discusses Broderick to illustrate how
widespread sexual favoritism can be found to violate Title VII.118 In
Broderick, a staff attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commission
alleged that two of her supervisors had engaged in sexual relationships
with two secretaries who received promotions, cash awards, and other
job benefits.119 Another of her supervisors allegedly promoted a staff
attorney with whom he socialized extensively and to whom he was
“noticeably attracted.”120 The court found that the supervisor’s conduct
created a hostile and offensive work environment for the plaintiff and
other women working in the office.121 The court acknowledged that
sexual favoritism in the workplace “undermined [the] plaintiff’s
motivation and work performance and deprived plaintiff, and other . . .
female employees, of promotions and job opportunities.”122 Although
Id. at 307-08.
Id. The court focused extensively on the fact that the relationship between the
administrator and his alleged lover was voluntary and consensual and found that it did not
equate to coercive behavior as prohibited by the EEOC. Id. at 307-08 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(g) (2005)).
115
Id. at 308.
116
Id.
117
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
118
Policy Guidance, supra note 85 (emphasis added).
119
Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1274.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1278.
122
Id. The district court, in reaching its conclusion that Title VII applied to consensual
relationships did not find that the plaintiff was denied an employment opportunity that
was granted to another less qualified employee who participated in such a relationship. Id.
at 1274. The court found that this claim lacked evidentiary support. Id.
113
114
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the Broderick decision turned on the hostile environment theory, the
EEOC’s Policy Guidance takes the position that the facts in Broderick
could also support an implicit quid pro quo harassment claim “since the
managers, by their conduct, communicated a message to all female
employees in the office that job benefits would be awarded to those who
participated in sexual conduct.”123
The same year that Broderick was decided, the Third Circuit rejected
a paramour claim brought by a plaintiff employed at a plant in Miller v.
Aluminum Company of America.124 The court found that such claims
“underestimate the essential element of disparate treatment based on
gender.”125
The court adhered to the DeCintio holding, finding
preferential treatment arising from a consensual relationship between a
supervisor and employee does not qualify as gender-based
discrimination.126

123
Policy Guidance, supra note 85 (citing Broderick, 685 F. Supp at 1278). The EEOC
guidelines further note that there were instances of unwanted sexual advances directed at
the plaintiff by her supervisor, which supported a quid pro quo claim more than a hostile
environment claim. Id. See also Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Va. 1988).
Although Spencer did not involve sexual favoritism, it is an early example of a case that
supports the proposition that pervasive sexual conduct can create a hostile work
environment for those who find it offensive, even if the targets of the conduct welcome it
and even if no sexual conduct is directed at the persons bringing the claim. Policy
Guidance, supra note 85, at n.14. In Spencer, the supervisor of an office engaged in daily
horseplay of a sexual nature with female subordinates. Spencer, 697 F. Supp. at 213. This
behavior included sitting on their laps, touching them in an intimate manner, and making
lewd comments. Id. The subordinates joined in and generally found the horseplay funny
and not offensive. Id. at 214. With the exception of one incident, none of the horseplay was
directed at the plaintiff. Id. The supervisor was also engaged in consensual relations with
at least two of his subordinates. Id. The court found that the supervisor’s conduct would
have interfered with the work performance and would have seriously affected the
psychological well-being of a reasonable employee, and on that basis it found a violation of
Title VII. Id. at 218.
124
Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
125
Id.
126
Id. The Aluminum court also examined and ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s other
claims alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and that her
termination resulted from preferential treatment of males in her workplace. Id. at 501-04.
The plaintiff then abandoned her original claim that she was discharged because of
preferential treatment of males, and based her new discharge claim solely on the favoritism
shown to her manager’s lover. Id. at 502. The court found that the defendant had brought
forth “ample” evidence of legitimate reasons for the plaintiff’s discharge and that the
plaintiff was discharged because the other woman was more experienced in the position
and had received higher performance ratings. Id. at 503. As for the plaintiff’s “paramour”
and hostile environment claims, summary judgment was granted to the defendant. Id. at
508.
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In examining DeCintio and Broderick, there appear to be two different
scenarios in which a hostile work environment claim may arise when an
employer promotes or hires the person with whom he or she is engaged
in a consensual sexual relationship.127 One scenario centers upon a
consensual relationship, which is kept separate from the workplace, until
the paramour is hired or promoted, as was the case in DeCintio and
King.128 The other scenario occurs when an employer or supervisor hires
or promotes an employee with whom he or she has an already
established consensual sexual relationship that is prevalent to those in
the workplace, such as the situation in Broderick.129 When DeCintio and
Broderick were decided, the EEOC guidelines had established that if a
better qualified employee was denied job benefits in favor of a
paramour, that situation might be enough to support a cause of action
for sex discrimination under a hostile work environment theory, even if
the discrimination was not so pervasive as to qualify as a hostile
environment under the Meritor guidelines.130 This is precisely the
scenario that the California Supreme Court was recently confronted with
in Miller v. Department of Corrections.131
F. The Decision in Miller v. Department of Corrections
In a groundbreaking development, the California Supreme Court
issued a unanimous decision in Miller v. Department of Corrections
holding that employees may sue their employers for sexual harassment
if a sexual affair between a supervisor and subordinate results in

127
Mary C. Manemann, The Meaning of “Sex” in Title VII: Is Favoring an Employee Lover a
Violation of the Act?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 612, 654, 656-57 (1989).
128
Id. Despite the circumstances, these cases created the possibility of Title VII violations.
Id. See also Kersul v. Skulls Angels, Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). In Kersul the
plaintiff alleged that a “close personal relationship” between her employer and another
female employee resulted in promotions and benefits for the other employee, despite her
substandard performance. Id. at 887. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that she was
terminated from her position because she criticized the promoted employee. Id. The court
in Kersul refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination based on a law with
language nearly identical to that of Title VII, and directed her to amend her pleadings to
specifically state that the employer and the promoted employee were having a sexual
relationship. Id. at 888-89.
129
Id. Thus under this scenario, courts have indicated that employees need not be
specifically targeted themselves in order to have a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim, if the harassment is sufficiently pervasive. See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1277 (citing
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1985)).
130
Id.
131
Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
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widespread sexual favoritism, creating a hostile work environment for
other employees not involved in the affair.132
In Miller, Edna Miller and Frances Mackey, both employees at the
Valley State Prison for Women, sued the Department of Corrections,
alleging that they were subjected to sexual discrimination and
harassment.133 Edna Miller began working for the Department in 1983.134
In 1994, while she was employed at the Central California Women’s
Facility, she heard rumors through other employees at the Department
that the chief deputy warden was engaged in sexual affairs with his
secretary and with another subordinate, an associate warden.135 Another
department employee admitted to Miller that she was also engaged in a
sexual affair with the warden.136 These affairs were not hidden from the
rest of the department; rather, there were occasions when the three
women would publicly argue over the warden while they were in the
workplace.137
In 1995, Miller competed for a promotion for facility captain against
one of the women with whom the warden was sexually involved.138 The
warden served on the interview panel and despite Miller’s “higher rank,
superior education, and greater experience,” the promotion went to the
warden’s paramour.139 At trial, Miller set forth evidence showing a

132
Stephen C. Tedesco & Jamie M. Harding, Employers Face Greater Risk from Workplace
Romance: California Supreme Court Rules that Office Affair May Give Rise to Sexual Favoritism
Claim, http://www.littler.com/presspublications/index.cfm?event=pubItem&pubItemID=
12824&childViewID=250 (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
133
Miller, 115 P.3d at 80. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were retaliated against for
complaining about the discrimination and harassment. Id. The other causes of action
brought by the plaintiffs were for sexual discrimination in violation of public policy,
disability discrimination in violation of FEHA, negligent retention and promotion, invasion
of privacy, assault and battery, false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Id. at 80 n.2. Frances Mackey passed away in 2003 and Edna Miller
was designated as the lead plaintiff in this case. Id. at 80 n.1.
134
Id. at 80.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 83.
138
Id. at 82.
139
Id. Within a year and a half, the warden’s lover was moved up at an “unusually
rapid” pace to the position of associate warden. Id. Because Miller was not previously
promoted to facility captain, she was ineligible to compete for any higher-ranking
positions, and the warden’s lover became her direct supervisor. Id. The plaintiffs
expressed concerns about the warden’s behavior and as a result of the complaints, one of
the plaintiff’s supervisors, who was also one of the warden’s friends, became abusive
towards the plaintiffs. Id. at 83. Miller eventually resigned when her complaints failed to
materialize into better working conditions, and Mackey also resigned after being
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pattern wherein co-workers having sexual relationships with the warden
received favorable treatment.140 She claimed that there was a message
being sent to other employees, including herself, that the only way to
move up in the workplace was to have sex with the warden, and that
such conduct constituted sexual harassment in violation of California’s
Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),141 which is closely based
upon Title VII of the federal law.142

repeatedly questioned by her supervisor regarding her participation in a Department
internal investigation into the warden’s behavior. Id. at 84-85.
140
Id. at 80.
141
Id. The FEHA defines “harassment because of sex as including sexual harassment,
gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Definition of Sexual
Harassment, http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/statutes/sexualhar.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
The FEHA regulations define “sexual harassment” as “unwanted sexual advances, or
visual, verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. This definition includes many
types of offensive behavior, including gender-based same sex harassment.
The following is a partial list of violations: Unwanted sexual advances;
Offering employment benefits in exchange for sexual favors; Making
or threatening reprisals after a negative response to sexual advances;
Visual conduct: leering, making sexual gestures, displaying of
suggestive objects or pictures, cartoon or posters; Verbal conduct:
making or using derogatory comments, epithets, slurs, and jokes;
Verbal sexual advances or propositions; Verbal abuse of a sexual
nature, graphic verbal commentaries about an individual’s body,
sexually degrading words used to describe an individual, suggestive
or obscene letters, notes or invitations; Physical conduct: touching,
assault, impeding or blocking movements.
Id.
Under FEHA, “[a]ll employers are prohibited from harassing employees in the workplace.”
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Employer Liability, http://www.dfeh.ca.
gov/statutes/employerliability.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
If harassment occurs, an employer may be liable even if management
was not aware of the harassment. An employer might avoid liability if
the harasser is a non-management employee, the employer had no
knowledge of the harassment, and there was a program to prevent
harassment. If the harasser is a non-management employee, the
employer may avoid liability if the employer takes immediate and
appropriate corrective action to stop the harassment once the employer
learns about it. Employers are strictly liable for harassment by their
supervisors or agents. The harasser can be held personally liable for
damages. Additionally, Government Code section 12940, subdivision
(k), requires an entity to take “all reasonable steps to prevent
harassment from occurring.” If an employer has failed to take such
preventative measures, that employer can be held liable for the
harassment. A victim may be entitled to monetary damages even
though no employment opportunity has been denied and there is no
actual loss of pay or benefits.
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The trial court dismissed the case, finding that the warden’s sexual
favoritism did not constitute harassment or discrimination under
FEHA.143 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that
non-favored employees are not victims of sexual harassment or
discrimination just because a supervisor grants favorable employment
opportunities to the person with whom the supervisor is having a sexual
affair.144 The court found that the female employees who were passed
over for promotions were in the same situation as male employees who
were passed over for the same employment benefits, thus concluding
that the case was not founded on sex based discrimination.145

Id. Under FEHA, all employers have a legal obligation to prevent sexual harassment.
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Employer Obligations, http://www.dfeh.
ca.gov/statutes/employerobligations.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
Employers must take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination
and harassment from occurring. Employers must help ensure a
workplace free from sexual harassment by posting in the workplace a
poster made available by the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing. Employers must help ensure a workplace free from sexual
harassment by distributing to employees information on sexual
harassment. An employer may either distribute a brochure that may be
obtained from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing or
develop an equivalent document, which must meet the following
requirements: The illegality of sexual harassment; The definition of
sexual harassment under state and federal laws; A description of
sexual harassment, utilizing examples; The internal complaint process
of the employer available to the employee; The legal remedies and
complaint process available through the Department and the Fair
Employment and Housing Commission; Directions on how to contact
the Department and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission;
[and] The protection against retaliation for opposing the practices
prohibited by law or for filing a complaint with, or otherwise
participating in investigative activities conducted by, the Department
or the Commission.
Id.
142
Thomas G. Servodidio, Recent California Employment Cases: Instructive for Employers in
All States, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Sept. 7, 2005 (also available on Westlaw at 2005 WLNR
14088574). The court noted that in interpreting California’s FEHA, it would look to federal
authorities interpreting Title VII. Miller, 115 P.3d at 88.
143
Miller, 115 P.3d at 85-86. The trial court determined that the evidence of the warden’s
sexual favoritism did not constitute discrimination or harassment under the FEHA, thus
summary judgment was granted to the defendant on that claim. Id. at 85.
144
Id.
145
Id. In regards to the plaintiff’s claim that the warden’s behavior created an actionable
hostile work environment claim, the Court of Appeals determined that:
Ignoring for the moment evidence of retaliation for threatened, or
actual, reporting of the relationships, plaintiffs have demonstrated
unfair conduct in the workplace by virtue of [the warden’s]
preferential treatment of his various sexual partners. However,
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The California Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on the 1990
EEOC guidelines addressing employer liability under Title VII for sexual
favoritism, finding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of
sexual harassment.146 The EEOC policy statement explains that while an
isolated incident of favoritism toward a paramour will not support a
sexual harassment claim, a “widespread sexual favoritism” involving
consensual relations may support a claim for workplace harassment
based on a hostile work environment for both male and female coworkers.147 The court acknowledged that an isolated incident of
favoritism towards an employee, with whom a supervisor is engaged in
a consensual sexual affair, does not ordinarily constitute sexual
harassment.148 The court concluded, however, that if the sexual
favoritism in the workplace is “sufficiently widespread it may create an
actionable hostile work environment in which the demeaning message is
conveyed to female employees that they are viewed by management as
‘sexual playthings’” or that the only way for a female employee to
advance her career is to engage in sexual conduct with her supervisor.149
beyond the fact of those relationships and the preferential treatment,
plaintiffs have not shown a concerted pattern of harassment
sufficiently pervasive to have altered the conditions of their
employment on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs were not themselves
subjected to sexual advances, and were not treated any differently than
male employees at [the prison]. Hence the trial court correctly
concluded there is no evidentiary basis for plaintiffs’ various sex
discrimination and harassment claims.
Id. at 86.
146
Id at 90. The court found that “an employee may establish an actionable claim of
sexual harassment . . . by demonstrating that widespread sexual favoritism was severe or
pervasive enough to alter his or her working conditions and create a hostile work
environment.” Id.
147
Id. at 88. Accordingly, a hostile work environment claim can be found regardless of
whether any objectionable conduct is directed at both male and female employees, and
regardless of whether those who were actually granted some type of favorable treatment
willingly engaged in the sexual favors or acts. Id. at 816. See also supra Part II.D.
148
Miller, 115 P.3d at 80. See also supra Part II.D.
149
Miller, 115 P.3d at 80. The Court found that this was much more than an isolated act
of favoritism by the warden towards his paramours given that he had caused his
paramours to be transferred to his new facility, had allowed the other supervisor to abuse
those who complained about his sexual affairs, specifically the plaintiff, and had solidified
his paramour’s job advancement based on sexual favors. Id. at 90. All of these factors led
the Court to its decision that the message was implicitly conveyed that the management
viewed women as “sexual playthings,” noting specifically that “it is clear under California
law that a plaintiff may establish a hostile work environment without demonstrating the
existence of coercive sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff or even conduct of a sexual
nature.” Id. at 92. This decision allows lawsuits by any employee challenging the
employment decisions by a supervisor who is confirmed to be engaged in, or is believed to
be engaged in, an office relationship. Greg Klawitter, Three California Supreme Court
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The court found the conduct to be “severe or pervasive” enough to alter
other employees’ working conditions and create a hostile work
environment.150 Therefore, Miller is the first published decision finding a
hostile work environment claim viable without evidence that any
individual, be it a third party colleague or the plaintiff herself, was
directly subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct.151
Sexual harassment jurisprudence has expanded quite a bit since
“ladies day in the house” when the word “sex” was added to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.152 Forty years hence, sexual harassment laws are still
being interpreted and expanded in new ways.153 It may be difficult to
predict the future of the law, but it is possible to prepare for new
interpretations and to modify current practices in an effort to catch
problems before they start, from an employer, employee, and judicial
perspective.154
III. ANALYSIS
In light of Miller, the guidelines of hostile work environment
jurisprudence have been significantly expanded and the implications
that could arise, especially in the form of employer liability, are worthy
of exploration.155 Part III begins with the proposition that the current
EEOC guidelines are insufficient to handle sexual favoritism claims
Decisions: Not All Good News (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.mofo.com/news/
updates/bulletins/bulletin02030.html#ThreeCalifornia. Thus any employee who knows
about an office romance and believes that he or she has been the victim of some type of
adverse employment decision can potentially file a lawsuit against the employer. Id. See
also Birschtein v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 4th 994, 1007 (1st Dist. 2001),
reh’g denied, S102158, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 288 (Cal. Jan. 16, 2002) (finding that employers are
liable for failing to remedy a hostile or offensive work environment of which supervisory
or management-level employees knew or should have known of the harassment and
holding that the employer may be held liable for a managerial failure to intervene to
prevent or end sexual harassment in the workplace caused by a fellow employee). The
federal standard for supervisory acts is different in that it requires that the employer have
knowledge or notice of the harassment. See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867
F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989).
150
Id. at 91 (quoting Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1999))
The Supreme Court stated that the FEHA clearly intrudes upon personal relationships,
thus any type of office romance between a supervisor and subordinate is subject to not only
scrutiny, but also potential liability. Id. at 93.
151
John H. Douglas, Consensual Office Affairs: On-the-Job Relationships Pose Risks if They
Evidence Widespread Sexual Favoritism, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 9. See also supra note 90
(cases holding contrary to the Miller holding).
152
See supra Part II.A.
153
See supra Part II.F.
154
See infra Part III.
155
See supra Part II.F.
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based on hostile work environment sexual harassment jurisprudence,156
and continues with a discussion of the tremendous effects Miller’s legacy
will have on employers, employees, and the workplace atmosphere.157
Finally, Part III analyzes why courts like the California Supreme Court
have gone too far in expanding hostile work environment sexual
harassment jurisprudence, which may lead to devastating effects on
employers nationwide.158 This Part will also detail what steps employers
must take to protect themselves.159
A. Insufficient EEOC Guidance
Hostile work environment sexual harassment jurisprudence has
branched off in a new direction, dramatically increasing the potential
breadth of sexual harassment law from the previously settled legal
framework.160 Traditionally, federal and state courts have followed the
reasoning stated in Section A of the EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual
Favoritism that “an isolated instance of favoritism toward a “paramour”
(or a spouse or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate
against women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are
disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.”161 However, now a
precedent has been set, resulting from an adherence to Section C of the
EEOC guidance, whereby employees may sue their employers for sexual
harassment if a sexual affair between a supervisor and a subordinate
results in sexual favoritism, thus creating a hostile work environment for
those employees not involved in the affair.162
The Miller decision creates a cause of action for employees who may
challenge any decision of a supervisor who is involved in, or allegedly
involved in, an affair or workplace romance and will create new sexual
harassment claims where none previously existed.163 This is significant

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
158
See infra Part III.C.
159
See infra Part III.C.
160
See supra note 90.
161
Policy Guidance, supra note 85. According to Scott Witlin, a shareholder in the Los
Angeles office of Ogletree Deakins, “The Miller decision weakens somewhat the long line of
cases which held that favoritism toward a paramour was not discrimination against
others.” Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Workplace Romance Presents
Liability Risk for California Employers (Aug./Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ogletree
deakins.com/uploads/publications/CA-Alert%20Aug-Sept%202005.pdf.
162
See supra Part II.F.
163
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. “The facts in the Miller case were a bit extreme,
but it is likely to spawn numerous lawsuits based on less extreme facts.” Ron Brand,
156
157
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because now both men and women can be deemed injured by sexual
favoritism.164 Given the long line of cases adhering to diametrically
opposed legal standards than that which Miller created, employers faced
with such claims will undoubtedly argue the merits of the former
standard in hostile work environment sex discrimination cases to
prevent the Miller rationale from prevailing.165
The EEOC has not fully addressed the scope of this issue, and as
demonstrated in California, fifty states may have fifty different
approaches to widespread sexual favoritism claims with no consistency
among them.166 Before Miller, courts relied on the standard set forth in
Section A of the EEOC guidance which describes in vague terms the
requirements for an isolated sexual favoritism claim.167 Although
Section A has been the default guidance for many courts, it fails to
clearly define and explain specific characteristics akin to isolated
favoritism as opposed to widespread favoritism.168 The policy guidance
is unclear as to why a party’s claim may fail on grounds of being isolated
and how many incidents must occur for a claim to fit into the “isolated
favoritism” category.169 Furthermore, the EEOC has failed to explain
what players are involved in an isolated favoritism claim.170 This lack of
clarification makes it difficult to differentiate between isolated and
widespread favoritism and leaves employers, employees and the courts
with very little guidance to follow.171
The current EEOC guidance is also insufficient to adjudicate
widespread sexual favoritism claims.172 Section C of the policy guidance
provided by the EEOC has suggested for several years the theoretical
possibility of a claim for sexual harassment based on sexual favoritism,
but the Miller decision is the first to fully succumb to the EEOC’s
guidance on widespread favoritism.173 Thus, despite the completely
consensual nature of the affair or romance, any employee, male or
female, who believes that a paramour received special treatment, may
Favoring a Paramour May Be Sexual Harassment (Oct. 2005), available at http://laborlawyers.
com/CM/Labor%20Letter/eLLoctoberr2005.pdf .
164
Douglas, supra note 151.
165
See supra note 90.
166
See supra Part II.F.
167
See supra note 90.
168
See supra note 86 and infra Part IV.
169
See supra note 86 and infra Part IV.
170
See supra note 86 and infra Part IV.
171
See supra note 86 and infra Part IV.
172
See supra note 86 and infra Part IV.
173
See supra Part II.F.
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now sue, as long as the conduct was considered severe and pervasive.174
However, Section C fails to clearly explain what constitutes this type of
behavior, how frequently the alleged conduct must occur, who can be
the perpetrator or victim in a widespread sexual favoritism claim, and
what exactly widespread favoritism means.175
Based upon the recent analysis of the EEOC guidance in Miller, the
vagueness of the language used in Sections A and C may lead to broader
interpretations of the law than the EEOC intended when the guidance
was drafted.176 The implications derived from Miller will impact sexual
harassment jurisprudence for years to come as employers and the courts
battle over sexual favoritism and the fine line differentiating “isolated”
and “widespread” sexual favoritism.177 Without clearer direction from
the EEOC, there is no telling how far sexual favoritism claims may reach
and how much sexual harassment jurisprudence will continue to
expand.178
B. Broadened Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence Affecting Employers
A whole new class of sexual harassment cases has emerged, brought
by a new class of plaintiffs, to recover under a theory that their
workplace is permeated with widespread sexual favoritism as a result of
consensual sexual relationships among colleagues.179 Miller drastically
expands the scope of hostile workplace sexual harassment claims and
opens employers to liability from which they previously were immune
under existing sexual harassment jurisprudence.180 Thus, the broadened

Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. See also supra Part II.F.
See infra Part IV. Additionally, the Court in Miller failed to clearly explain when a
workplace “gets to the point where women are ‘sexual playthings.’” Brand, supra note 163.
176
Brand, supra note 163.
177
Elizabeth M. Marsh, Sexual Favoritism: When an Office Romance Can Result in a Hostile
Work Environment Claim (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.thompsoncoe.com/
default.aspx?tabid=116&ArticleID=229&ctl=AttPub&mid=791&From=Att&action=Edit.
178
See infra Part IV. “The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller means that employers now
face greater risk from workplace romances, and the decision will impact sexual harassment
litigation for years to come as both employers and the courts struggle with the definition of
sexual favoritism and the difference between isolated and widespread sexual favoritism.”
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.
179
See supra Part II.F.
180
Michael J. Lotito, Workplace Romance May Create Hostile Work Environment for Other
Employees (July 25, 2005), available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.
cfm?aid=818. See also supra note 90.
174
175
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scope of hostile work environment sexual harassment claims may have a
great effect on all aspects of the workplace.181
Prior cases limited actionable sexual harassment claims to only those
employees either directly involved in sexual liaisons at the workplace or
recipients of unwanted sexual advances on the job.182 The Miller holding
demonstrates the extent to which intra-office relationships can lead to
litigation, and now, as a result of this holding, not necessarily just
litigation brought by a scorned lover.183
The risk-management
implications from an employer’s perspective are now far greater for any
kind of interactions between supervisory and subordinate employees, be
it simply flirtatious banter or a full blown consensual affair.184 This new
standard practically guarantees that any action taken by a supervisor
and his or her paramour in the workplace will be subject to heightened
scrutiny because employers will now be forced to monitor their
employees’ conduct and the relationships of their supervisors to ensure
that paramour favoritism does not become a widespread problem within
the workplace.185 Employers will have to take great care to investigate
workplace rumors and carefully monitor and review any new hires or
promotions in which a supervisor is involved in order to avoid hostile
work environment claims from third party employees down the road.186
By thoroughly investigating purportedly severe and pervasive
discrimination claims brought by non-favored employees, employers
will be left with little choice but to inquire into affairs that previously
may have been considered private matters between mutually consenting
adults.187 If the alleged hostile environment claim were to involve only
one paramour, then even under the Miller standard, a claim of
discrimination might not be actionable.188 However, if the claim involves
more than one alleged paramour, the employer should consider whether
See supra Part II.F. “Although this is a California decision, employment lawyers
everywhere are sounding the alarm for employers who wish to avoid this type of claim.”
Marsh, supra note 177.
182
Lotito, supra note 180. See also supra Part II.B.
183
See supra Part II.F.
184
See supra Part II.F.
185
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. The California Supreme Court, in recognizing
that its decision puts employers in the position of becoming involved in employees’
personal consensual relationships, noted that the consensual relationship alone is not the
problem; rather, it is the effect of the relationship upon the workplace that creates potential
liability. Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 94 (Cal. 2005).
186
See supra Part II.F.
187
See supra Part II.F. “Alliances, affairs and romances between employees are a fact of
life.” Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.
188
See supra Part II.F.
181
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the supervisor’s actions may be considered severe or pervasive and
whether such conduct interferes with other employees’ working
conditions or work performance, as was found to be the case in Miller.189
Unfortunately, the Miller court failed to clearly establish when conduct
within a workplace reaches the point where women are seen as “sexual
playthings,” which still makes the severe and pervasive requirement
inquiry unclear.190 Thus, there is very little guidance provided to
employers which can be used as guidelines in looking for these warning
signs in order to protect themselves.191
C. Preventative Measures Must Be Taken by Employers
The workplace is a major social center for men and women who
share a common interest through their employment and who may spend
eight to twelve hours a day working with and getting comfortable with
other employees.192 Employees often meet their significant other in the
workplace.193 In light of this expanded sexual harassment jurisprudence,
employers face new risks and need to gain an understanding of how
everyday operations may be impacted within the workplace.194
Employers may not learn about a consensual relationship until it has
already had an adverse effect on the workplace and once it is that late in
the game, employers may face significant liability for sexual
harassment.195
The Miller court failed to lay out precise standards spelling out the
differences between isolated and widespread sexual favoritism.196 Thus,
there appears to be a very thin line separating the two, which guarantees
that any action taken by a supervisor with regard to his or her paramour
could leave the employer wide open to lawsuits filed by non-favored
employees.197 Employers need to become aware that sufficiently severe
or pervasive circumstances may provide the basis for a cause of action
See supra Part II.F.
See supra Part II.F.
191
See supra Part II.F.
192
Dennis M. Powers, The Eight Managerial Office Romance Strategies, http://www.the
vault.com/nr/newsmain.jsp?nr_page=3&ch_id=420&article_id=19042&cat_id=1441 (last
visited June 30, 2006).
193
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. See also supra Part I.
194
See supra Part II.F.
195
Jack Sholkoff, California Supreme Court Expands Definition of Sexual Harassment; Court
Imposes New Duties on Employers To Monitor Effects of Consensual Relationships Between
Employees (July 19, 2005), available at http://www.martindale.com/labor-employmentlaw/article_Holland-Knight-LLP_173296.html.
196
See supra Part II.F.
197
See supra Part II.F.
189
190
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for sex discrimination, despite the fact that the employer may have
assumed that any decisions were based on personal preference rather
than sex.198 A politically incorrect twist is that Miller may have the effect
of “leveling the workplace playing field somewhat for the ‘attractively
impaired’”199 as supervisors consciously or subconsciously monitor their
own behavior for signs of favoritism based on lusty appetites or physical
appearance.200
Because it is not the affair or romance itself that is unlawful, but its
possible impact on other employees that is the impetus for employer
liability, all employers can do to protect themselves is to prevent the
romantic relationship from affecting other employees in the
workplace.201 First, employers need to treat claims of sexual favoritism
as seriously as a quid pro quo claim for unwanted sexual advances and
follow up on any claims with prompt and thorough investigations, just
as they would do for any other sexual harassment claim.202
Second, employers should take preventative measures including the
implementation of “detailed, narrowly-tailored anti-harassment, nonfraternization, and/or anti-nepotism policies”203 which discourage office
198
Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 1, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.weil.com/wgm/pages/Controller.jsp?z=r&sz=
bl&db=wgm/cbyline.nsf&d=FCD05FD0779C4E448525705700528C91&v=0.
199
Douglas, supra note 151.
200
Id.
201
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. A spokesman for the California Attorney
General’s office called Miller a warning that “tells employers that having an antinepotism
policy is not enough.” Lotito, supra note 180.
201
Lotito, supra note 180. Employers “need to do more to make sure . . . [they] have a
hostility-free work environment even when workers are having consensual sexual
relationships.” Id.
202
See supra Part II.C. Employers that think they are safe under the protection of
employment practices liability insurance must verify that their coverage extends to new
causes of action such as job related favoritism leading to sexual harassment claims, or else
seek out other measures to reduce the risks. Lotito, supra note 180.
203
Klawitter, supra note 149. Employers need to hit home the message to their
supervisors that the implications of Miller mean that an inter-office sexual relationship
need not be coerced in order to result in potential employer liability. Id. See Powers, supra
note 192.
1.
Adopt a Reasonable Office Romance Policy. Most companies
adopt a “benign neglect” policy towards office romances between
coworkers, provided there are no legitimate complaints about
performance or keeping the relationship discrete. Many will adopt a
more restrictive approach to boss/subordinate relationships, including
the ability to transfer or remove the evaluative function of the
subordinate to a third party. It makes sense to adopt written
reasonable policies, so employees understand the ground rules and
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relationships, particularly between employees who are in a
subordinate/supervisor work-relationship to the extent allowed by state
privacy laws.204 Of course a fine line exists as to policies engaging in the
latter arrangement where two people on equal footing engage in a
feel comfortable in their workplace (see The Office Romance for the
managerial details).
2.
Communicate this Policy. Clearly communicate your firm’s
reasonable policies on office romance—including who to contact for
confidential advice and what procedures to follow in a conflict-ofinterest or supervisorial situation. Be sure that every employee
understands the corporate climate at your office.
3.
Mediate. When a broken romance spills over into the workplace,
restrain the urge to arbitrarily assign blame and transfer or fire the
culprit under a one-size-fits-all sexual harassment policy. Instead,
suggest mediation to help the couple work out their differences—and
the conditions under which to continue working together. A mediator
can be a trained facilitator, the company appointed “ombudsman,” or
even a coworker that both parties respect.
4.
Keep the channels of communication open.
Encourage
employees to “speak their piece” openly and confidently, regardless of
their complaint or concern. A positive, supportive environment fosters
not only the airing of problems, but also potential solutions—without
an attorney getting into the fray.
5.
Follow basic concepts of fairness. Fairness means employing a
neutral and consistent investigation of complaints that treats each
party with equal respect—regardless of gender or rank in the
workforce. Fairness does not mean addressing every employee’s
complaint—only the reasonable and legitimate ones.
6.
Respond promptly and discreetly to problems.
Reassure
employees that valid complaints will be taken seriously. Make your
response timely, confidential, and appropriate—whether it’s mediation
or an investigation. Train your managers on how to properly manage
workplace romances.
7.
Respect your employees’ privacy. Adopt at least a neutral
attitude toward employee dating and other off-the-job behavior,
focusing instead on what workers do on company time in meeting
corporate goals. Unless you suspect illegal action, do not police your
employees or intercept their confidential messages. Don’t make
employees into “love” police.
8.
Be “pro-interactive.” Support concepts of gender equality, day
care and elder care, family leave, and other corporate “pro-interactive”
policies. Support the inevitable relationships and marriages that will
occur. People who enjoy working together in an open, positive
environment work better—and to the benefit of their supervisors and
the company. Pro-interactive companies just don’t have the same
problems as others do. Remember love does win out, despite
restrictive policies—and the best employees do leave to work for more
progressive organizations.
Id.
204
See Klein & Pappas, supra note 198. The policies need to be drafted with care because
they may create even more litigation. Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.
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relationship and one of the parties is promoted to a position of direct
power or control over the other party in the consensual romantic
relationship.205 Issues of that nature may encourage an all-or-nothing
policy whereby no dating whatsoever is allowed between any employees
in order to prevent case by case discrepancies.206 If employees are
prohibited from dating, it is logical to infer that there should be no
instances of sexual favoritism in the workplace.207 These are necessary
measures to protect the employer and employee interests, even if such a
policy is interpreted as interfering with personal and private
relationships, which can in turn harm employee morale.208
Third, employers may want to consider implementing consensual
relationship agreements known as “love contracts.”209 Such agreements
spell out the standards of behavior and professionalism required of the
individuals that choose to enter into a romantic relationship and help
protect employers from a sexual harassment suit if two employees are
dating and the relationship ends badly.210 Furthermore, if the employees
are in a supervisor-subordinate working relationship, it may be wise for
both parties to agree that one will transfer to another area within the
company or some other comparable provision.211 This type of protection
may provide an alternative that appeases employers, while still allowing
employees to maintain personal relationships without fear of reprisal.212
Finally, employers may also want to consider adding another
provision to the language of their sexual harassment policies that
specifies that harassment can occur when supervisors favor subordinates
or other colleagues due to consensual sexual involvement and include a
discussion on the topic during anti-sexual harassment training.213 After
Lotito, supra note 180.
Id.
207
Klein & Pappas, supra note 198.
208
Id. A recent commentator on the Miller holding said that, “[T]he Court’s decision will
likely have deleterious effects upon employee privacy and impose significant and what
may seem as unfair burdens upon employers to monitor employee personal relationships
in an effort to avoid sexual harassment—as defined by the Court in Miller—from
developing in the workplace.” Sholkoff, supra note 195.
209
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.
210
Lindsay Fortado, Workplace ‘Love Contracts’ on the Rise: Agreements Used To Hedge
Against Sexual Harassment Claims, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2005, at 24. “The use of love contracts
is ‘not a majority rule yet, but it’s increasing,’ said April Boyer, an employment partner in
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham’s Miami office.” Id. “Some employers are
going beyond traditional.” Id.
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the Miller decision, a failure to implement these steps may send the
message to other employees that engaging in an affair with a supervisor,
although consensual, is the way to get ahead.214
The Miller decision has created the need for the EEOC to clarify its
Policy Guidance on Sexual Favoritism in the isolated and widespread
contexts so that employers, employees, and the courts have a better set of
guidelines to follow as sexual harassment jurisprudence grows and
changes.215 Additionally, as the law changes, employers will be faced
with many new challenges in the hostile work environment arena;
therefore, employers must take proactive measures to prevent a
widespread problem of sexual favoritism in the workplace.216 Employers
will have to, at a minimum, discourage workplace affairs, and possibly
prohibit them altogether, and then thoroughly investigate any claims
that may arise.217
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE
ON SEXUAL FAVORITISM
One cannot fit a square peg into a round hole, but that is exactly
what the California Supreme Court attempted to do in Miller. The
square peg of sexual favoritism, based on the EEOC Policy Guidance
supporting the widespread favoritism theory, was forced into the round
hole known as hostile work environment sexual harassment
jurisprudence. The broadened sexual harassment jurisprudence appears
to raise as many questions as it answers. Under this new standard,
liability for all office romances turns on the fine line distinction between
isolated sexual favoritism, which is currently not actionable, and
widespread sexual favoritism, that now can be construed as creating a
hostile work environment.218 New widespread favoritism cases will be
coming to the forefront as a result of Miller, and perhaps an even greater
expansion of the current sex discrimination laws will be the goal of the
next case to come along. Courts need a concise framework to control
such claims. In an effort to curb frivolous claims based on sexual
favoritism, and to protect employers from undue liability, the guidance
provided by the EEOC must be amended to provide a concise formula
for the courts to follow when confronted with claims in the newly
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recognized area of widespread sexual favoritism, in order to
accommodate the proverbial square peg.
Immediate action must be taken so that employers are not
wrongfully subjected to liability for claims that do not fit within the
ambiguous widespread sexual favoritism framework that currently
exists under Section C of the EEOC Policy Guidance.219
Sex
discrimination laws were not created to include unfairness claims, or
claims based on a person’s preference for a paramour over other
employees; rather they are in place to protect people from discrimination
based on sex.220 The California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
law is overbroad; thus the way to control claims based on sexual
favoritism is to clarify and define what types of conduct qualify as
widespread, severe, or pervasive enough to be actionable under hostile
work environment sexual harassment jurisprudence. The EEOC Policy
Guidance has been influential in helping courts analyze sexual
harassment claims, however, no cognizable bright line standard exists
which easily discerns the differences between isolated and widespread
favoritism based on the current standards set out by the EEOC. Updated
standards need to be formulated to create a sexual favoritism framework
that does not allow for gross misinterpretations of the law.
Relevant circumstances within a hostile work environment may
include the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s
work performance.221 However, the severe and pervasive elements in
hostile work environment cases are difficult to assess because courts
have been inconsistent in defining the conditions needed to qualify as
sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive.222 An additional
inconsistency that must be addressed is the frequency with which the
conduct must occur before a cause of action can be found under
widespread favoritism. There is also no clear standard in place for
employer liability where supervisors are involved in the favoritism
context. Thus, based on the Miller holding, it is unclear what amounts to
severe and pervasive, or even the exact definitions of isolated and
widespread favoritism. A single supervisor could have more than one
paramour, or multiple supervisors could each have their own paramour.
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Without exacting guidelines, it is impossible for employers to know
what conduct qualifies as severe or pervasive within their workplace, if
it is widespread or isolated, and how to prevent such acts in an effort to
protect themselves from litigation.
Section A of the EEOC guidance currently states:
[A]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a
“paramour” (or a spouse or a friend) may be unfair, but
it does not discriminate against women or men in
violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for
reasons other than their genders. A female charging
party who is denied an employment benefit because of
such sexual favoritism would not have been treated
more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely,
was she treated less favorably because she was a
woman. 223
An amended version of Section A of the EEOC guidance may state:
Isolated favoritism is favoritism toward a paramour that
occurs on no more than three occasions and is not severe and
pervasive within the workplace. Conduct is found to be severe
and pervasive when both men and women who find this
offensive can establish that the conduct was so uncomfortable
that that the conditions of [their] employment are altered,
creating an abusive working environment that a reasonable
person would find intolerable. An isolated instance of
favoritism toward a “paramour” (or a spouse or a
friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate
against women or men in violation of Title VII, since
both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their
genders. A female charging party who is denied an
employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism
would not have been treated more favorably had she
been a man, nor, conversely, was she treated less
favorably because she was a woman. A claim alleging
sexual favoritism will be considered isolated if the supervisor
or authority figure was engaging in acts with a single
paramour on three occasions or less, provided that the general
workplace atmosphere was not impacted by such behavior. If
the supervisor or authority figure was involved with either
223
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more than one paramour, or, acted on more than three
occasions with either a single or multiple paramours, the
behavior will not be considered isolated. However, even if the
behavior is not isolated, that does not mean that it fits within
the definition of widespread favoritism, unless the behavior is
also severe and pervasive, according to the guidelines specified
in Section C.
Although there have been consistent holdings rejecting isolated
favoritism claims, for purposes of clearly differentiating isolated
favoritism factors from widespread favoritism factors, it would be
beneficial for the EEOC to alleviate any confusion by providing exact
factors that spell out isolated favoritism characteristics under Section A
of the policy guidance. The amended version of Section A first includes
a definition of “isolated.” Isolated is defined in the dictionary as
“occurring alone or once; sporadic.”224 However, the EEOC may refine
the definition of isolated so that it is even more tailored to sexual
harassment claims in the favoritism context.
Second, the EEOC should include the exact number of incidents
necessary to qualify as isolated favoritism. For example, as shown in the
amended version of Section A, an isolated instance of favoritism may
mean that the alleged conduct occurred no more than three times. The
number of instances could be higher or lower depending on the EEOC’s
adopted definition of isolated, assuming that the EEOC would not follow
a strict dictionary definition. Although three is an arbitrary number, the
number of instances necessary to qualify as isolated should not be so
limited that a claim could be made based on just a single incident. If
only one occurrence of favoritism was necessary to form a valid cause of
action, then anyone could complain at any time about anything they
perceive to be even remotely offensive. If that were the case, then all
incidents of favoritism would have to, by default, fit into the widespread
favoritism category and there would be no way to differentiate between
isolated and widespread claims. Additionally, the amended version of
Section A specifies that an isolated instance of favoritism is not severe or
pervasive and provides guidelines as to when conduct qualifies as severe
or pervasive.
Third, the EEOC needs to identify the parties in an isolated
favoritism claim. Right now it is unclear whether an isolated claim
involves just one supervisor and just one paramour, or if multiple
224
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supervisors could each have their own paramours. There are obvious
ambiguities within this area that the EEOC should address by providing
examples of who fits within the isolated framework. The proposed
amended version of Section A specifies that a supervisor or authority
figure who has engaged in acts with a single paramour on three
occasions or less, provided that the general workplace atmosphere was
not impacted by such behavior, will be considered isolated.
Furthermore, to elaborate on the differences between isolated and
widespread favoritism claims, the proposed amended Section A also
provides that a claim will not be considered isolated if a supervisor or
authority figure was involved with either more than one paramour, or,
acted on more than three occasions with either a single or multiple
paramours.
By creating its own definition of isolated sexual favoritism, spelling
out the exact number of instances necessary to qualify as isolated
favoritism, and clearly identifying the players, frivolous claims alleging
sexual favoritism can be identified early and eliminated before they
affect employers, other employees and the workplace morale.
The same principles apply to Section C of the current EEOC
guidance which currently provides:
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is
widespread in a workplace, both male and female
colleagues who do not welcome this conduct can
establish a hostile work environment in violation of Title
VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is
directed at them and regardless of whether those who
were granted favorable treatment willingly bestowed
the sexual favors. In these circumstances, a message is
implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as
“sexual playthings,” thereby creating an atmosphere
that is demeaning to women. Both men and women
who find this offensive can establish a violation if the
conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the
conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive
working environment.225
An amended version of Section C may state:
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If favoritism based upon a granting of sexual favors
consensual romantic or sexual relationship is widespread in
a workplace, both male and female colleagues who do
not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII, regardless of
whether any objectionable conduct is directed at them
and regardless of whether those who were granted
favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual
favors. In these circumstances, if a message is implicitly
conveyed in a severe or pervasive manner that the
managers view women or men as “sexual playthings,”
thereby creating an atmosphere that is demeaning to all
women or men within the workplace. The sexual favoritism
is widespread if the relationship is conducted publicly within
the workplace and is known or should be known by the
employer, and where the favoritism was displayed in a severe
and pervasive manner, occurring on at least four or more
occasions. The conduct may not be mere office gossip.
Conduct is severe and pervasive when both men and
women who find this offensive can establish that the
conduct was so uncomfortable that the conditions of
[their] employment are altered, creating an abusive working
environment that a reasonable person would find intolerable.
A claim alleging sexual favoritism will be considered
widespread if the supervisor or authority figure was engaging
in acts with a single paramour on three or more occasions and
the general workplace atmosphere was permeated by such
severe and pervasive behavior. If the supervisor or authority
figure was involved with more than one paramour, or, acted
on more than three occasions with either a single or multiple
paramours, the behavior will be considered widespread if the
general workplace atmosphere was permeated by such severe
and pervasive behavior.
The requirements to bring a successful hostile work environment
claim are stringent; therefore Section C of the EEOC guidance should
ensure that the requirements for bringing a claim under the widespread
favoritism theory are just as strict.226 As shown in the amended version
of Section C, the EEOC should replace the words “granting of sexual
favors” with “consensual romantic or sexual relationship.” This change
is necessary because the current wording creates the inference that the
226
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relationship is based purely on sex or may even be a quid pro quo
relationship. As the amended Section C shows, it should be emphasized
that the relationship in question was entered into by both parties on a
consensual basis.
Second, the line in the current EEOC guidance pertaining to claims
brought by third parties who are not the targets of objectionable conduct
should be eliminated. This sentence causes problems because it allows
anyone to bring a claim, even those not directly targeted by objectionable
conduct. Parties bringing claims under the widespread sexual favoritism
framework should only be allowed to do so when the conduct is directed
at them, or adversely affects all men and women in the workplace. This
clarification will help eliminate frivolous claims. Furthermore, it is
contradictory to say that a message is being conveyed that women are
seen as “sexual playthings” when the women involved in the
relationship willingly and consensually bestow sexual favors. Section C
does not currently take into consideration that a female supervisor could
become involved with a male employee, even though the possibility
exists that men could be consensually bestowing sexual favors and could
thus be perceived by others in the workplace as “sexual playthings.”
The proposed amended version of Section C eliminates this problem by
acknowledging that men could also be viewed as “sexual playthings.”
To that end, when the message is found to be demeaning to all women or
men within the workplace, a claim will hold greater weight than if only
one completely unrelated third party lodges a complaint because the
possibility of the problem being widespread is considerably greater.
Third, because this area of sexual harassment law is still rather
unexplored, the EEOC must provide an exact definition of widespread
favoritism. The dictionary definition of widespread is “widely diffused
or prevalent; widely extended or spread out.”227 Since widespread is a
rather broad concept, the EEOC will have to first adopt a more specific
definition that caters to the favoritism context. For example, as shown in
the proposed amended version, the EEOC must redefine widespread
sexual favoritism. The amended definition is better than the EEOC’s
current explanation of widespread favoritism because it explains that an
employer should know, or should have known of the conduct and when
the conduct is considered to be common knowledge within the
workplace, and how many incidents must occur to qualify as
widespread. Whatever definition the EEOC adopts needs to be clearly
differentiated from its adopted definition of isolated favoritism.
227
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Fourth, severe and pervasive elements are among the most
important factors pertaining to a hostile work environment claim, yet
there are no precise guidelines defining these elements for employers
and courts to follow.228 There must be greater emphasis on the exact
factors necessary to equate severe or pervasive behavior. The dictionary
definition of severe is “inflicting physical discomfort or hardship;
inflicting pain or distress.”229 The dictionary definition of pervade,
which is the root of pervasive, is “to become defused throughout every
part.”230 A better explanation of severe or pervasive in the widespread
favoritism context, as shown in the amended version of Sections A and
C, would read,
Conduct is severe or pervasive when both men and women
who find this offensive can establish that the conduct has
altered the conditions of [their] employment, creating an
abusive working environment that a reasonable person would
find intolerable.231
The EEOC could also impose a mandatory sliding scale approach to
be used when analyzing elements that could be perceived as severe or
pervasive.232 This approach allows a greater degree of pervasiveness to
make up for a lesser degree of severity and vice versa.233 These
definitions and distinctions between severe and pervasive conduct are
extremely important because they are the basis of hostile environment
claims and yet there are currently no standard definitions for courts to
follow when evaluating such claims.
Fifth, greater emphasis needs to be placed on how the employee
complaining about the harassment was actually affected by the alleged
acts. Since hostile work environment claims can currently be alleged by
third parties who were not directly subjected to unwelcome sexual
conduct, the degree of conduct that can be perceived as disparate is far
broader. The EEOC must address how vast the degrees of separation
between the supervisor, paramour, and third party can be before the
person is too far removed to make a claim. For example, the EEOC could
require that the person making the claim must share the same supervisor
as the paramour, or that the paramour must have a comparable job
228
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position as the complainant. This type of guidance will ensure that
claims made by far removed parties will not fit within the proscribed
framework set out by the EEOC. Furthermore, this type of guidance can
be incorporated into company anti-dating policies to help employers and
employees understand what types of conduct will cause trouble and
who is in a position to make a claim should inappropriate conduct occur.
Sixth, it is imperative that a minimum number of sexual favoritism
instances must have occurred to fit within the widespread category. This
number must be considerably broader than the number of claims falling
within the isolated favoritism category. Although the four instance
minimum mentioned in the above amended version of Section C is
arbitrary, it shows that the conduct occurred frequently enough to be a
legitimate problem that fits within the widespread sexual favoritism
framework, as long as the conduct was also severe or pervasive under
the amended EEOC guidance.
Finally, the EEOC must also address the parties involved in a
widespread sexual favoritism claim. In Miller, the supervisor was
romantically involved with three different women.234 The EEOC should
specify that for a claim to fall within the widespread category, a
supervisor must either engage in a certain specified number of instances
of favoritism with only one paramour, or, the supervisor must engage in
a certain number of separate acts with a minimum number of
paramours. As demonstrated in the amended version of Section C, this
type of guidance will further the goal of drawing a brighter line between
isolated and widespread sexual favoritism claims.
Although sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims are very
fact specific, the EEOC must provide greater guidance in this area. The
key is that employers and courts cannot be expected to delve into a new
area of sexual harassment jurisprudence without having stricter
guidelines to follow. Although the above suggestions are strictly
hypothetical, the principle ideas behind the amendments to the
guidelines are applicable. By adding more specific information to the
current EEOC guidelines, employers, employees, and the courts will
have better guidance in this area of law.
V. CONCLUSION
The law is not perfect, which is why it is always changing and
evolving alongside our nation. However, the California Supreme
234
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Court’s decision in Miller v. Department of Corrections has taken hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims to an unprecedented level
and courts are quickly responding to the new trend.235 Employers
throughout the United States will inevitably suffer dire consequences if
they are held responsible for consensual relationships that are nearly
impossible to restrict.236 Although workplace romances are typically
discouraged, there will never be a completely fool-proof plan to
eliminate romances in the workplace, be they secretive or completely
open.237 Employers need to know that they may be liable even when no
one in the workplace is being discriminated against on the basis of sex.238
The immediate solution to this growing problem is to provide stricter
guidelines for the courts to follow which clearly spell out the exact
elements necessary for a claim to be brought under the widespread
sexual favoritism framework.239 With stricter guidelines and a sliding
scale to help weigh the most important factors, the possibility of keeping
the number of successful widespread sexual favoritism claims to a
minimum may be achieved.240
At this time, it is difficult to ascertain whether courts will follow
Miller’s precedent or if they will continue to apply precedents, such as
DiCintio, that clearly preclude claims of sexual discrimination based on
sexual favoritism.241 Either way, the foundation for a whole new class of
sexual harassment claims has been laid and employers nationwide
should pay close attention because the California judiciary often sets the
stage for precedents that are later adopted by other states and
jurisdictions.242 Every office has its secret romances, but now, as this
judicial trend spreads across the nation, employers may be the ultimate
loser in the tangled game of lust.243
Meghan E. Bass*

See supra Part II.F.
See supra Parts III.B & C.
237
See supra Parts III.B & C.
238
See supra Parts III.B & C.
239
See supra Part IV.
240
See supra Part IV.
241
See supra Part II.E.
242
Servodidio, supra note 142.
243
See supra Part III.C.
*
J.D. Candidate 2007, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S., Hotel Administration,
Cornell University, 2004. I would like to thank my mother and father, brother, and aunt
and uncle for their continued support of all of my dreams, their constant guidance during
trying times, and helping to make me into the person I am today. I would also like to
thank Professor Nuechterlein for all of her assistance throughout the notewriting process.
235
236

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

